




The Dissertation Committee for Arun Arvind Nair
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Efficient Modeling of Soft Error Vulnerability in
Microprocessors
Committee:




Earl E. Swartzlander, Jr.
Michael D. Bryant
Efficient Modeling of Soft Error Vulnerability in
Microprocessors
by
Arun Arvind Nair, B.E.; M.S.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
May 2012
To my parents: Arvind and Premlata Nair.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to my advisor Prof. Lizy John for her guidance and sup-
port throughout my tenure here at UT Austin. I am grateful for the flexibility
and resources she has provided me in order to make my research possible, and
her availability to discuss issues and problems with research.
I have had the privilege of collaborating with Prof. Lieven Eeckhout,
who greatly helped to shape this dissertation. I am immensely grateful to him
for his guidance and encouragement, and the many hours of proof-reading and
correcting my conference paper submissions.
I thank Dr. Stijn Eyerman for his guidance while developing the mecha-
nistic model. He provided me his implementation of interval analysis profilers,
which enabled me to concentrate on developing the AVF model. I am deeply
indebted to Arijit Biswas for taking time out to explain the various issues
regarding AVF evaluation, and for reading my papers and providing detailed
comments. I am thankful to Shubu Mukherjee for the initial discussions and
inputs that lead to the work presented in this dissertation.
I am grateful to the members of my committee (in alphabetical order):
Prof. Michael Bryant, Prof. Mattan Erez, Prof. Earl Swartzlander, and
Prof. Nur Touba. Their feedback has been invaluable towards improving the
quality of my research. Prof. Herb Krasner was kind enough to employ me
v
as a Teaching Assistant for various courses that he has taught. I had the
pleasure of working as a TA with Prof. Vijay Garg and Prof. Miryung Kim,
and I thank them for their support. I am also grateful to Prof. Vijay Reddi
for his advice and help towards my job search.
I also thank my labmates at the Laboratory of Computer Architecture
(LCA) (in alphabetical order): Aashish Phansalkar, Ciji Isen, Deepak Panwar,
Dimitris Kaseridis, Faisal Iqbal, Jian Chen, Jeff Stucheli, Jungho Jo, Karthik
Ganesan, Lloyd Bircher, Nidhi Nayyar, Umar Farooq and YoungTaek Kim, for
comments, or feedback on my research, proposal and defense practice talks. I
enjoyed my collaboration and conversations with Jian on each other’s work.
Discussions with Faisal over coffee and/or lunch, on research, cricket, culture,
or pretty much anything else were always fun. I have also enjoyed the company
of Dimitris and Ciji and particularly appreciate their efforts in making me feel
home when I first joined the group. I am grateful to Karthik for his help with
the SNAP GA framework, and the simpoints that he generated for SPEC
CPU2006.
I am grateful to a number of people in my family who made this pos-
sible: to my parents, Arvind and Premlata Nair, for their support, love, and
encouragement; to my sister Sonal, brother-in-law Dhaval, cousins Anand and
Amrita, and Ami for their support. And not the least, to my fiancèe Sunita,
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Reliability has emerged as a first class design concern, as a result of an
exponential increase in the number of transistors on the chip, and lowering of
operating and threshold voltages with each new process generation. Radiation-
induced transient faults are a significant source of soft errors in current and
future process generations. Techniques to mitigate their effect come at a sig-
nificant cost of area, power, performance, and design effort. Architectural
Vulnerability Factor (AVF) modeling has been proposed to easily estimate the
processor’s soft error rates, and to enable the designers to make appropriate
cost/reliability trade-offs early in the design cycle. Using cycle-accurate mi-
croarchitectural or logic gate-level simulations, AVF modeling captures the
masking effect of program execution on the visibility of soft errors at the out-
put. AVF modeling is used to identify structures in the processor that have the
highest contribution to the overall Soft Error Rate (SER) while running typical
workloads, and used to guide the design of SER mitigation mechanisms.
vii
The precise mechanisms of interaction between the workload and the
microarchitecture that together determine the overall AVF is not well stud-
ied in literature, beyond qualitative analyses. Consequently, there is no known
methodology for ensuring that the workload suite used for AVF modeling offers
sufficient SER coverage. Additionally, owing to the lack of an intuitive model,
AVF modeling is reliant on detailed microarchitectural simulations for under-
standing the impact of scaling processor structures, or design space exploration
studies. Microarchitectural simulations are time-consuming, and do not easily
provide insight into the mechanisms of interactions between the workload and
the microarchitecture to determine AVF, beyond aggregate statistics.
These aforementioned challenges are addressed in this dissertation by
developing two methodologies. First, beginning with a systematic analysis
of the factors affecting the occupancy of corruptible state in a processor, a
methodology is developed that generates a synthetic workload for a given
microarchitecture such that the SER is maximized. As it is impossible for every
bit in the processor to simultaneously contain corruptible state, the worst-case
realizable SER while running a workload is less than the sum of their circuit-
level fault rates. The knowledge of the worst-case SER enables efficient design
trade-offs by allowing the architect to validate the coverage of the workload
suite and select an appropriate design point, and to identify structures that
may potentially have high contribution to SER. The methodology induces
1.4× higher SER in the core as compared to the highest SER induced by
SPEC CPU2006 and MiBench programs.
viii
Second, a first-order analytical model is proposed, which is developed
from the first principles of out-of-order superscalar execution that models the
AVF induced by a workload in microarchitectural structures, using inexpensive
profiling. The central component of this model is a methodology to estimate
the occupancy of correct-path state in various structures in the core. Owing
to its construction, the model provides fundamental insight into the precise
mechanism of interaction between the workload and the microarchitecture to
determine AVF. The model is used to cheaply perform sizing studies for struc-
tures in the core, design space exploration, and workload characterization for
AVF. The model is used to quantitatively explain results that may appear
counter-intuitive from aggregate performance metrics. The Mean Absolute
Error in determining AVF of a 4-wide out-of-order superscalar processor using
model is less than 7% for each structure, and the Normalized Mean Square
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Shrinking process geometries have enabled an exponential increase in
the number of transistors fabricated on a chip, with each successive process
generation. While this process has enabled lower operating voltages and higher
frequencies, it has also made reliability of hardware an increasingly important
design criterion. Radiation induced faults are a significant source of transient
faults in hardware, and the situation is expected to worsen with smaller feature
sizes [1–4].
Transient faults, unlike permanent or hard faults, are temporary in
nature, and disappear once the factor causing the fault disappears. Radiation-
induced faults are transient faults that occur as a result of strikes by energetic
particles such as neutrons from cosmic radiation, and alpha particles from
radioactive trace elements in the packaging materials. A particle of sufficient
energy displaces electrons in the substrate in sufficient number to flip the state
of the storage element, or logic gate. As transistor threshold voltages and
operating voltages reduce, less energy is required to cause a bit flip, making
soft errors a more acute problem in future process generations.
High-end microprocessors have protected large SRAM arrays such as
1
the last-level caches against transient faults with Single-bit Error Detection,
Double-bit Error Correction (SECDED) codes. Increasingly, however, it is
becoming necessary to protect latches and flip-flops in the core as well. For
example, Fijutsu’s 130nm SPARC64 design [5] protects 80% of the latches
with parity bits. IBM POWER7 [6] additionally correct single event upsets
by enabling re-execution of faulting instructions. Such soft-error mitigation
strategies incur significant overheads in terms of performance, power, area
and design effort, necessitating judicious application of these techniques.
Mitigating Soft Errors: Soft errors can be mitigated through changes in
process technology, circuits, microarchitecture, or architecture [7]. Mukherjee
et al. [7] note that while Silicon On Insulator (SOI) technology reduces the
the radiation induced fault rate at the transistor level, it does not completely
eliminate the problem. Circuit-level techniques such as radiation hardened
circuits, or increased transistor sizing can be employed to reduce the suscepti-
bility of individual circuits. However, they incur a significant area and power
penalty. Microarchitecture-level solutions such as parity-based error detection,
and correction or recovery can be utilized. For example, the IBM POWER
7 has features to detect soft errors, and re-execute faulting operations [6].
These techniques protect against faults that are detected early enough such
that re-execution is possible. Naturally, there is a significant overhead for
implementing error detection and recovery circuitry. At a higher level, redun-
dant execution techniques, such as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) can be
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used, in which three pipelines execute the same program in lockstep, and the
output is compared at every cycle. In the event that one processor experiences
a fault, a voting mechanism picks the majority value as the correct one.
Due to the significant overhead in implementing SER mitigation schemes,
it is necessary to balance the need for SER mitigation with performance, power,
area and design effort targets. Two methodologies to address this issue are
presented in this dissertation. A methodology to estimate the worst-case SER
observable while running a realizable workload is developed. This methodology
enables the designer to make informed decisions regarding efficient design for
worst-case SER. Furthermore, a first-order analytical model to estimate SER
is developed. This enables the architect to perform design space exploration,
parametric studies, and workload characterization for soft error vulnerability.
1.1 Modeling the Vulnerability to Soft Errors
Most usage scenarios do not need the high level of error protection af-
forded by techniques such as TMR. In such usage scenarios, the additional
overhead of guaranteeing error-free operation may be undesirable. For exam-
ple, typical servers or consumer devices need to meet a reliability target for
which strategies such as TMR are excessive, and too expensive. For such usage
scenarios, designers would prefer to meet their reliability objectives efficiently,
by protecting a small number of structures in the processor, such that the
overhead of the soft-error mitigation mechanisms is minimized. The design-
ers thus need a methodology to identify the structures that require protection
3
such that the Soft Error Rate (SER) is brought within specifications.
Prior research [2, 8] has shown that masking effects of program behavior
have a significant impact on the visibility of faults to the user. Wang et al.
[8] report that nearly 85% of all the transient faults in the core are masked by
program execution. Different programs stress the microarchitecture differently,
thereby exposing or masking faults at different rates. Furthermore, certain
structures, such as the branch predictor affect only performance, and have
no impact on correctness: a fault in the branch predictor’s history counter
values may affect performance, but not correctness. This suggests that it
is unnecessary to protect every single bit in the processor to bring the SER
within specifications. Therefore, it becomes necessary to model the impact
of program execution on the visibility of the faults, in order to protect the
structures in the processor that are the highest contributors to the overall
SER, such that the overall reliability target is met.
This masking effect of program execution is captured using Architec-
tural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) modeling, which expresses the probability
that a fault occurring in a particular structure will manifest itself as an error
in the program output. Architects use AVF modeling to determine the mask-
ing effect of a set of workloads. The architect may decide to add sufficient
SER mitigation mechanisms such that the observable SER while running a
typical workload is brought within specifications. AVF modeling thus enables
the architect to efficiently select SER mitigation schemes such that the target
SER is met.
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Statistical Fault Injection (SFI) can be used to compute the AVF of a
structure. Using a Register Transfer Level (RTL) or logic gate-level models of
the processor executing a workload, single faults are injected into a structure
at random instants in time. The average fraction of such injected faults that
manifest as program errors would then be measured to estimate the masking
effect of the workload on the faults in that structure. However, RTL sim-
ulations are time-consuming, and SFI requires a large number of runs with
randomly injected faults, for statistical significance. Furthermore, RTL mod-
els are not available during the early design planning and thus have limited
use in guiding microarchitectural decisions for mitigating soft errors.
In order to move AVF modeling earlier in the design cycle, Mukherjee,
et al. [2] propose Architecturally Correct Execution (ACE) analysis to provide
a conservative estimate of AVF. ACE analysis only requires a single execution
of the workload on a microarchitecture-level performance simulator, which is
orders of magnitude faster than an RTL model. ACE analysis estimates AVF
by capturing the fraction of bits per cycle in a hardware structure that contain
correctness-critical state. ACE analysis is thus a very useful tool in estimating
the efficacy of architecture-level SER mitigation schemes during the early de-
sign phase. It enables the architect to estimate the power, performance, area
and reliability trade-offs of design decisions much earlier in the design cycle.
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1.2 Motivation
The observable SER of a workload is strongly dependent on the mi-
croarchitecture, workload, and underlying circuit-level fault rates. Different
programs stress microarchitectural structures differently, and hence a change
in the microarchitecture, or underlying circuit-level fault rates alters their
observed SER by different proportions. There has been limited work on an-
alyzing the fundamental program characteristics affecting the masking effect
of program execution. The complex interaction between the microarchitec-
ture and workload imply that simple performance metrics, such as IPC or
cache miss rates do not correlate with AVF. AVF estimation is reliant on
detailed microarchitectural simulations, which report aggregate metrics, but
do not uncover the fundamental factors affecting AVF. A large number of
time-consuming simulations are required to derive some insight on the effect
of parametric or design changes on AVF. Whereas black-box statistical or
machine-learning based methodologies have been proposed [9–11], they rely
on detailed microarchitectural simulations, and provide no insight into the
precise mechanisms influencing AVF. In the following discussion, a motivation
for better understanding the effect of program execution on AVF is presented.
1.2.1 Mitigating the Effect of a Biased Workload Suite
There is no known methodology for selecting workloads for AVF bench-
marking that are demonstrably representative of the entire population of user














Figure 1.1: Choice of the design-point, under different SER coverage scenarios
chitecture and circuit-level fault-rate does not neccessarily do so when either
factor is changed. Therefore, any design decision made based on the AVF
induced by a small set of workloads is potentially biased either towards over-
design, or under-design. This is a common statistical sampling problem: how
does one verify whether the mean of the sample is equal to the mean of the
population? This is made worse by the fact that workloads for AVF evaluation
are not picked through random sampling, but a result of specific choices, and
are hence likely to be biased. Furthermore, AVF simulation requires detailed,
microarchitecture-level simulations, which are computationally intensive. In
order to avoid the prohibitive expense of running the entire workload on a
detailed performance simulator, the designer would typically run short traces
of these workloads, potentially increasing the sampling bias.
Such biases in the workload suite may potentially lead to over-design
or under-design for SER mitigation. An overdesigned processor has a higher
power, performance and area penalty, whereas an under-designed processor
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may fail to meet its reliability goal. To protect against potential under-design
due to a workload suite biased towards low SER, architects add a guard band,
or safety margin [12]. There is no known methodology for estimating the guard
band. This guard band is often selected based on designer intuition. It may
be very expensive to correct underdesign for SER later in the design cycle, and
it is therefore important to model AVF as accurately as possible during the
early design stages. Figure 1.1 represents two scenarios, assuming a design for
the highest observed SER (other design points are possible, such as average,
median, or a percentile of the workload suite). The arrows depict the range
of SER observed while running the workload suite. Scenario 1 represents
the case in which the workload suite has sufficient SER coverage, and an
additional guard band is unnecessary. Automatic addition of a guard band
will push the design point beyond the maximum attainable SER, leading to
over-design. On the other hand, scenario 2 represents a case in which the
workload suite requires a significant safety margin to guard against potential
under-design, due to the significant gap in its SER coverage, relative to the
worst-case observable SER. The knowledge of the worst-case observable SER
thus allows the architect to pick the appropriate guard band, and to validate
the SER coverage of the workload suite.
Estimating this worst-case observable SER is non-trivial. It is not pos-
sible for every bit in the processor to contain correctness-critical state simul-
taneously, due to complex interactions between the various structures in the
processor. For example, instructions in the rerder buffer will be issued into the
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load queue, store queue, branch units, or arithmetic units, based on their type.
An increase in instructions of one type will result in a proportionate reduction
in state in the other units. Thus, simply adding the circuit-level failure rates
of all bits in the core would result in gross overestimation. Furthermore, the
circuit-level fault rates of each structure may be different. The same amount
of correctness-critical state in a structure with a higher fault rate is likely to
expose more errors than a structure with a low fault rate. There is therefore
a need for a systematic methodology to develop a workload that maximizes
the visibility of soft errors for a given microarchitecture and circuit-level fault
rates.
1.2.2 Design-time AVF modeling
Detailed microarchitectural simulations have become the mainstay of
computer architecture research and development, due to their relative accuracy
and flexibility. Architects typically use detailed microarchitectural simulations
to study the effect of microarchitectural or parametric changes on AVF, power,
area and performance, in order to determine the best trade-off between these
objectives. However, such simulations can be time-consuming when performed
over a large number of workloads, for a large number of instructions, and
over a large number of microarchitectural configurations. Such simulations
provide aggregate metrics, and it is difficult to draw inferences on the precise
impact of the workload and various microarchitectural parameters on AVF
and performance using these metrics.
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Additionally, it is time consuming to perform design space exploration
or parametric sweeps for various microarchitectural parameters using detailed
simulation. The simulator masks the precise microarchitectural mechanisms
that influences the aggregate metrics, providing little insight into their under-
lying causes. For example, it is difficult to estimate the efficacy of an SER
mitigation scheme proposed in literature [13], involving the enabling soft-error
mitigation mechanisms in the shadow of a last-level data cache miss, without
implementing this mechanism in the simulator.
Analytical design space methodologies can complement cycle-accurate
simulations for performing experiments, such as parametric sweeps or design
space exploration. The computational simplicity of an analytical model al-
lows the architect to use these models to cheaply explore the design space,
and eliminate infeasible design points, and guide detailed simulations. A well-
constructed analytical model also provides invaluable insight into the mech-
anisms influencing AVF and performance, allowing the designer to make in-
formed design choices. Owing to its simplicity, an analytical model also allows
the architect to study a greater number of workloads, over a larger number of
instructions than may be possible using detailed simulations.
1.2.3 Characterizing Workloads for their Impact on AVF
The precise mechanism of the masking effect of program execution on
the visibility of soft-errors has not been sufficiently studied, making workload
characterization for AVF a significant challenge. Fu et al. [14] report a “fuzzy
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relationship” between AVF and simple performance metrics. Other statistical
or machine-learning based models [9–11] rely on detailed microarchitectural
simulations and fail to provide insight on the fundamental interaction between
the software and hardware that together determine AVF. Given a workload
and aggregate metrics obtained using microarchitectural simulations, it is only
possible to make very qualitative predictions on its influence on AVF of a struc-
ture. Oftentimes, the interaction between various microarchitectural events
produces results that run counter-intuitive to these qualitative predictions.
The ability to characterize workloads for their influence on AVF allows
the architect to identify workloads that are likely to induce high or low AVF
in a particular structure. This, in turn, enables the architect to validate the
heterogeneity of the workload suite being used to evaluate the Soft Error Rate
(SER). A workload suite with sufficient heterogeneity is essential for enabling
the architect to make correct design decisions for reliability and performance.
1.3 Thesis Statement
The microarchitectural events triggered by the execution of the work-
load influence the architectural vulnerability factor of the structures in a given
microarchitecture. It is feasible to develop an automated methodology that
generates a synthetic workload to exercise these microarchitectural events such
that the Soft Error Rate is maximized. It is also feasible to efficiently model the
architectural vulnerability factor by modeling the impact of these microarchi-




The challenges outlined in Section 1.2 are addressed through the fol-
lowing contributions:
• Starting with a detailed study of the impact of microarchitecture-dependent
workload characteristics on the occupancy of corruptible state in the
core, an automated methodology for developing a workload that uncov-
ers the worst-case Soft Error Rate (SER) of a given microarchitecture
is developed. First, a systematic methodology to develop a code gener-
ator which takes a set of parameters, or knobs, to produce a synthetic
workload is demonstrated. The knobs control the microarchitecture-
dependent workload characteristics that influence the occupancy of cor-
ruptible state in microarchitectural structures is proposed. Second, the
code generator is interfaced to an iterative, feedback-driven optimization
loop utilizing a genetic algorithm. Upon the convergence of the genetic
algorithm, the optimized workload, called an AVF stressmark, estimates
the worst-case soft error rate.
• It is demonstrated that the stressmark achieves 1.4× higher SER in
the core, 2.5× higher SER in the data L1 cache and TLB, and 1.5×
higher SER in L2 cache as compared to the highest SER induced by



















Figure 1.2: Utilizing the model to perform design space exploration.
Alpha 21264. The flexibility of this methodology across different mi-
croarchitectures, and underlying fault rates, is demonstrated. It is also
demonstrated that näıve estimates of the worst-case, such as adding the
raw circuit-level fault rates of all structures, or adding the highest SER
induced by any workload in the workload suite, on a per-structure basis,
to estimate the worst-case observable SER will lead to significant errors,
and consequently, potential overdesign or underdesign.
• Starting with a comprehensive study of the impact of microarchitectural
events on the occupancy of correct-path state in microarchitectural struc-
tures, a mechanistic modeling methodology that predicts the occupancy
of correctness-critical state in the microarchitecture, using inexpensive
profiling is developed. The modeling methodology is developed from first
principles of out-of-order processor execution, to provide insight into the
precise mechanisms that influence the SER of the microarchitecture ex-
ecuting a given workload. Figure 1.2 presents the general overview of
the modeling methodology. Workloads are profiled to capture important
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metrics required by the model, which is a one-time effort. Multiple mi-
croarchitectures can then be modeled using the data from a single profile.
The Mean Absolute Error for estimating the AVF for a structure of a 4-
wide out-of-order microarchitecture is less than 7%, and the Normalized
Root Mean Square Error is 9.0%.
• It is demonstrated that this mechanistic model can be used to cheaply
perform design space exploration studies, and evaluate the efficacy of
soft error mitigation mechanisms. The model can be used to study the
impact of design changes on AVF and performance. Due to its construc-
tion, it is able to provide novel insight into the interaction between the
workload and the microarchitecture that together determine the AVF of
a structure.
• It is demonstrated that the mechanistic model can be used to perform
workload characterization for AVF. Using the mechanistic model, the
architect can study a greater number of workloads, for a longer period of
time than might be possible using detailed simulations. The model can
also be used to identify workloads that would induce high or low AVF in
a structure, thereby enabling the architect to validate the heterogeneity
of the workload suite.
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TVF Timing Vulnerability Factor (Section 2.5)
AVF Architectural Vulnerability Factor (Section 2.6)
SER Soft Error Rate
ACE Architecturally Correct Execution (Section 2.7)
FIT Failure In Time (Section 2.1)
MTTF Mean Time to Failure (Section 2.1)
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure (Section 2.1)
MTTR Mean Time to Repair (Section 2.1)
SEU Single Event Upset
SFI Statistical Fault Injection (Section 1.1, 2.7.4)
IPC Instructions Per Cycle
CPI Cycles Per Instructions
Table 1.1: List of Acronyms or Abbreviations used in this Dissertation.
1.5 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
A list of acronyms and abbreviations used in this work is presented in
Table 1.1, to aid easy reference. Additionally, the expansion of each acronym
or abbreviation is repeated in each chapter of this dissertation, to aid clarity.
1.6 Organization
Chapter 2 provides a background for the causes of soft errors in modern
microarchitectures, and methodologies to estimate the soft error rate of the
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processor while running a workload. A background on the first-order mecha-
nistic modeling of performance of a processor, and other work related to the
objectives of this dissertation can also found in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 outlines
the simulators, workloads, and evaluation methodology used in this disserta-
tion. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology to generate an AVF stressmark, its
evaluation, and application towards design for mitigating soft errors. Chapter
5 elaborates on the mechanistic modeling methodology for AVF, its evaluation,
and applications towards design for soft error mitigation. Finally, Chapter 6
summarizes the key results and insights presented in the dissertation, and




Radiation-induced transient faults, also known as Single Event Upsets
(SEU), occur as a consequence of strikes from energetic sub-atomic particles,
such as alpha particles and neutrons. Alpha particles are emitted as a result of
radioactive decay of contaminants in the packaging materials. Neutrons that
reach the earth’s surface typically arise as a result of the interaction between
cosmic radiation and the earth’s upper atmosphere. Particles with sufficient
energy may strike silicon to release electron-hole pairs, which may then be
swept into the diffusion region of the transistor in sufficient number so as to
register an incorrect value. The lower the threshold and operating voltages, the
fewer such electron-hole pairs are necessary to cause a fault. This implies that
less energetic sub-atomic particles may cause faults as operating voltages are
lowered in future process generations. Soft errors due to neutron bombardment
tends to increase with altitude. For example, Denver, CO, situated at 5000
feet above sea level experiences nearly 5× more cosmic radiation flux than
New York City, at sea level [15]. Leadville, CO, located at over 10,000 feet
above sea level experiences nearly 13× more cosmic ray flux than New York
City [15].
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Soft errors have long been a problem in space and avionics applica-
tions, due to the higher rate of bombardment from cosmic radiation. High-
availability and high-reliability mainframes have devoted resources for pro-
tection from soft errors at ground level. However, as operating voltages are
lowered, as a result of shrinking device geometries, and an acute need to re-
duce the power consumption of the chip, soft errors are becoming an issue for
commodity servers as well. A fault that passes out to the program output
without being detected by hardware is termed as a Silent Data Corruption
(SDC). If the hardware is equipped to detect and correct this fault, the SDC
is eliminated. However, if the system is unable to correct the fault, it may
raise an exception, or crash. This is termed as Detected Unrecoverable Error
(DUE). High-reliability and high-avaliability systems aim to minimize SDC,
and reduce the DUE errors.
2.1 Metrics for Reliability
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) or Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
is often used to capture the reliability of a system, and is typically measured
in terms of the number of failures per year. MTBF is defined as the sum of
the MTTF and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). In other words, MTBF is
the sum of the system uptime, and downtime. IBM Server group specifies
an MTBF for the entire system of 1000 years for SDC, 25 years for system
software crashes, and 10 years for application crashes [2, 12]. Each system will
have multiple CPUs, and other components, that may fail for many reasons
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in addition to SEUs. Failure in Time (FIT) is often used to express the SER
of a structure, and is a reciprocal of the Mean Time to Failure. Specifically,
FIT captures the number of faults occurring in 109 hours. Thus, 1 FIT is
equivalent to an MTTF of 109 hours.
2.2 Incidence of Soft Errors in Real Systems
There have been numerous studies on the incidence of soft errors at
or near ground level for SRAMs and DRAMs [3, 15–17]. In 2000, Sun Mi-
crosystems reported that the error protection scheme implemented for their
SRAM chips on their UltraSPARC II-based servers was insufficient to han-
dle soft errors [18]. In 2005, Hewlett-Packard reported that their 2048-CPU
ASC-Q supercomputer installation at Los Alamos National Laboratory, lo-
cated 7000 feet above sea level, had frequent crashes due to soft errors in its
parity-protected board-level cache tag array [18, 19]. With the lowering of
operating voltages and more state on chip as a result of complex pipelines, a
greater number of latches, flip-flops, and logic are vulnerable to particle strikes,
making the processor pipeline vulnerable to soft errors [2, 12, 20–22].
When a large number of such processors are used, such as large data-
centers, or supercomputer installations, the combined effect of such faults be-
comes especially acute. Owing to their regular structure, SRAMs and DRAMs
are easier to protect with error detection and correction codes. However, the
processor pipeline, or core, has unstructured logic, latches, and flip-flops, which
are difficult to protect thus, without incurring significant power, performance,
19
and area penalties. Fortunately, not all faults occurring in the core necessarily
result in soft errors due to masking at the circuit-level, microarchitecture-level,
or program-level. Masking of faults may occur due to program characteristics,
underutilization of structures in the core, or due to structures that do not
contribute to program correctness, such as the branch predictor.
2.3 Modeling Intrinsic SER
This section provides a brief overview of the raw SER estimation method-
ologies for a bit or circuit element. The first step is to determine the critical
charge (Qcrit) for the transistors in the circuit. Qcrit is defined as the mini-
mum charge produced by an incedent neutron or alpha particle, necessary to
flip the state of the transistor. Qcrit can be determined from simulation, such
as SPICE models, or empirically, by exposing a circuit to elevated levels of
neutron and alpha particle bombardment. One of the models used to compute
the circuit level fault rate is the Hazucha and Svensson model [23], and is
expressed as
Circuit SER ∝ Flux× Area× e−
Qcrit
Qcoll
where Flux, Area, and Qcoll refer to the neutron or alpha particle flux, ex-
posed circuit area, and collection efficiency, respectively. Qcoll is defined as the
fraction of charge generated by a particle strike that was collected by the tran-
sistors and is determined emperically. Qcrit, Qcoll and Area generally decrease
with each new process generation, at different rates for combinatorial, latch
and SRAM circuits. Sivakumar et al. [20] find that combinatorial circuits
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will see a significant increase in SER, latches will experience some increase in
SER, and SRAMs will experience negligible increase in SER with each process
generation.
2.4 Masking Effect of the Circuit on SER
Combinatorial logic gates result in three kinds of masking [18, 20, 24].
Logical masking occurs if the particle strike affects a portion of the circuit that
has no bearing on the output of the gate. For example, a bit flip on one input
node of an AND gate, when the other input node is set to 0, is logically masked.
Electrical masking occurs as a result of attenuation of the pulse created by the
particle strike as it propagates through the combinatorial logic, such that it is
supressed before it reaches the output of the circuit. Latch window masking
occurs if the Single Event Upset (SEU) pulse reaches a latch outside its setup
and hold time. These factors can be estimated using a simulator, such as
SPICE [20].
Timing Vulnerability Factor (TVF), also referred to as timing derating
[12], captures the fraction of time for which a circuit is vulnerable to SEUs
[18].
Sivakumar et al. [20] note that technology scaling rapidly reduces the
size and Qcrit of logic gates, as compared to SRAM cells, making them more
vulnerable in future process generations. Additionally, electrical masking in
logic circuits will decrease in future generations, resulting in increased SER due
to the core. Furthermore, in high frequency designs, the ratio between setup +
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hold time of latches and flip-flops as compared to the clock period is not small,
resulting in a larger TVF [12]. Consequently, Nguyen and Yagil [12] predict
that the SER contribution due to static combinatorial circuits will become
comparable to that of latches in future process technologies. Sivakumar et al.
predicted an exponential increase in the SER due to combinatorial circuits,
under the assumption of aggressive processor pipelining with each process
generation. Power constraints have meant that very deeply pipelined designs
such as the Intel Pentium 4 have fallen into disuse, hence the exact rate of
increase is unclear, and is not as much of an issue as predicted. Nevertheless,
the pipelines in current processors are generally deeper than those dating back
to the late 1990’s or early 2000’s, with the notable exception of the Intel
Pentium 4.
2.5 Masking Effect of Program Execution on SER
The execution of a program on the microarchitecture also determines
what fraction of SEUs manifest as errors at the output. Program execution
is ultimately the cause of logical masking at the circuit level. Program execu-
tion also determines the utilization of structures, and whether a computation
affected by an SEU is necessary for correctness of the program. A fault in a
storage element at a time when it is not being used, such as an unused entry in
the ROB, will not propagate to the output, and is therefore masked. A fault
in the unused 32 bits in a 64-bit register holding a 32-bit value will be masked.
The former case is considered a time component of masking, wheareas the
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latter case is a space component of masking of an active entry [12]. Modern
microprocessors contain a significant amount of state devoted to structures
that do not affect correctness of the program, but only enhance performance.
For example, a fault in an entry of the branch predictor’s history table or the
Branch Target Buffer may lead to an incorrect control path being fetched.
However, this would be detected when the branch is executed, and corrected
by discarding the wrong-path instructions, and fetching from the correct path.
This speculative execution is a common feature in modern microproces-
sors, and creates masking effects of its own. For example, the branch predictor
may predict the branch to be taken, whereas the correct control flow of the
workload requires it not to be taken. Upon the detection of this “mispredic-
tion”, the instructions fetched from the wrong path (i.e., the taken path) must
be discarded. Any fault affecting the instructions in the wrong path will never
be committed to the program output, and is hence masked.
Instructions in the workload may also result in masking. For example,
NOPs do not affect the result of computation. Therefore, other than the bits
that identify the NOP (corresponding to its opcode), a fault in a NOP entry
will be masked. Compilers also introduce instructions to enhance performance
that may be dynamically dead. For example, a load instruction may be hoisted
past a conditional branch to hide some of its latency, but may be used only
along one branch path. If the other branch path is taken, the loaded value
would be dynamically dead. Similarly, a function from a dynamically linked
library may return a value that is never read, and hence dead. Butts and Sohi
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[25] show that 3-16% of dynamic instructions are dead. Instructions whose
values are not consumed are called First Level Dynamically Dead (FDD).
Transitively Dynamically Dead (TDD) instruction values are used only by
FDD instructions, or other TDD instructions. This is equally applicable to
memory operations: stores whose values are subsequently overwritten before
they are read are dynamically dead. As the values of these instructions do not
affect the output of the program, their correctness is not critical.
Logical masking could occur at the program level. For example, an
operation such as R3 = R1 AND 0x00FF only retains the lower 8 bits of R1 and
clears the rest, implying that a fault in the higher order bits is masked. Some
Instruction Set Architectures (ISA) support predication. Predication attempts
to reduce the branch misprediction penalty of hard-to-predict branches by
converting a control dependence into a data dependence. Predication makes
the execution of an instruction dependent on (or predicated on) the status of
a predicate register, set by the branch condition evaluation instruction when
it evaluates to true. Instructions for which the predicate register evaluates to
false are discarded, thereby masking faults in their results.
2.6 Architectural Vulnerability Factor
Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) expresses the probability that
a user-visible error will occur, given a Single Event Upset (SEU) in a bit or
storage element [2]. AVF is analogous to derating, or logic derating [12], error
cross-section and residency [26], which are terms used depending on the level
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of analysis, or institution. This dissertation will consistently use the term
AVF. AVF is a property of a hardware bit in a structure, and can be used to
compute its soft error rate as follows:
SERbit = AV Fbit × TV Fbit × intrinsic fault ratebit (2.1)
where TVF refers to the Timing Vulnerability Factor (see Section 2.4). The in-
trinsic fault rate is estimated using experimental, or simulation methodologies,
such as those outlined in Section 2.3.
The SER of each bit in a chip is aggregated to compute the overall
SER for the chip, while running the workload. This method to estimate SER
is therefore also called AVF+SoFR, where SoFR stands for Sum of Failure
Rates.
2.7 ACE Analysis
AVF expresses the probability that a radiation-induced fault in a bit
in a hardware structure will be observable at the output. The computation
of AVF requires the determination of whether the corruption of a value con-
tained in the bit will affect the correctness of the program. The greater the
fraction of time for which the bit-cell in hardware holds critical values, the
lesser is the masking of faults affecting the bit-cell. Although it is possible to
determine AVF of a bit in a structure using Statistical Fault Injection (SFI)
on a gate-level, or Register Transfer Level (RTL) model, this methodology
requires a large number of simulations for statistical significance, and is there-
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fore time-consuming. Additionally, RTL models are unavailable during early
design planning. Mukherjee et al. [2] propose ACE analysis in order to al-
low conservative AVF estimation during the early design phase. ACE analysis
requires only a single execution of a workload on a microarchitectural model,
which is significantly faster than SFI.
2.7.1 Architecturally Correct Execution (ACE) Bits
Mukherjee et al. term bit values — induced by a workload in a structure
— whose correctness is essential for the correctness of the program, as Archi-
tecturally Correct Execution bits or ACE bits [2]. An ACE bit is one whose
correctness is required for the correctness of the program. A bit could be ei-
ther microarchitecturally or architecturally ACE. A microarchitectural ACE
bit is not architecturally visible, but its correctness is nevertheless required.
For example, the head and tail pointers of the ROB or IQ are microarchi-
tecturally ACE, as any corruption in their contents would lead to incorrect
execution of the program, even though the programming model is oblivious
to their existence. On the other hand, architecturally ACE bits are directly
visible to the programmer, and any corruption in their state may result in
incorrect execution. These include corruption in data resident in the ROB,
issue queue, register files and caches.
Conversely, Mukherjee et al. term bits that are not critical to program
correctness as un-ACE. Microarchitecturally un-ACE bits could result from
bits that represent unused or invalid state, bits discarded as a result of mis-
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speculation, or bits in predictor structures. Architecturally un-ACE bits are a
direct result of the instructions in the binary. Examples of these include NOPs,
software pre-fetches, predicated false instructions, and dynamically dead in-
structions. Other than the few bits that are critical for these instructions to
be decoded correctly, the bits for both these instructions are un-ACE.
Whether a bit is ACE or not in cache structures depends on the nature
of reads and writes to that structure. For example, a store to a location that
has been affected by an upset will overwrite the corrupted data; the location,
during the period of time leading up to the write, is therefore un-ACE. On the
other hand, a load from a location affected by a fault will bring in corrupted
data into the processor. Assuming that this load itself is ACE, this location
in the cache is also ACE. Biswas et al. [27] introduce the concept of lifetime
analysis to determine the ACE-ness of a cache structure. Assuming a writeback
cache, a cache-line is ACE between Fill ⇒ Read, Read ⇒ Read, Write ⇒ Read
and Write ⇒ Evict.
For Content Addressible Memory (CAM) arrays, assuming a single bit
upset model, a corrupted entry could be mistaken for another, if they differ
in only one bit position, or Hamming distance of one. Therefore, a per-bit
lifetime analysis is performed only on such bits.
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2.7.2 Computing AVF using ACE Analysis













AVF of a structure may thus be expressed as the average number of ACE bits
per cycle divided by the total number of bits in the structure. The AVF is
multiplied by the circuit-level fault rate (i.e., TV F × instrinsic fault rate)
to estimate the SER of the structure. The SER of each structure in the chip
is added, to compute the overall SER of the chip.
ACE analysis is intended to provide a conservative estimate of AVF
during early design planning. Thus, it assumes a bit is ACE unless it can
be proven otherwise. Similarly, it will make the most conservative assumption
regarding the circuit-level masking of soft errors. Additionally, it assumes that
the soft error rate is low enough such that the probability of multiple radiation
strikes affecting the same bit value or instruction is negligibly small, when
used to estimate SER. This is generally true in terrestrial applications, but
may overestimate SER under elevated levels of radiation, such as accelerated
bombardment of the chip in radiation chambers. Nevertheless, it provides a
good estimate of the occupancy of corruptible state in the processor.
It should be mentioned that classical reliability analysis has been ap-
plied to computational reliability, at a circuit level. Assuming that errors are
exponentially distributed with a constant failure rate λ, the reliability of that
28
component over a time period of t is modeled as R(t) = e−λt. While this
model may help estimate the fault rate of each bit, it is unclear whether the
distribution holds after the masking effect of logic and program execution is
considered [22, 28]. Therefore, using a methodology called SoftArch, Li et al.
[22] use the exponential failure rate model to estimate AVF, in a manner sim-
ilar to ACE analysis. The key difference is that ACE analysis is a point of
strike model, directly measuring AVF of the bit based on whether the bit value
will eventually affect the output, whereas SoftArch propagates the probability
of a fault until it reaches the output through a store operation to memory
and then computes the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) based on the aggre-
gate probabilities of faults of each operation that led to the output. AVF of a
structure is then computed using the MTTF.
2.7.3 Limitations of ACE Analysis
ACE Analysis has limitations, owing to its conservatism in computing
SER, lack of detail in the the microarchitectural model, and the sum-of-failure
rate methodology under certain circumstances. These are outlined below:
• Practical Memory Limitations: In theory, ACE Analysis should track
instruction dependencies across registers, memory and even I/O de-
vices, such as the disk. In practice, such tracking would require massive
amounts of memory, and is therefore impractical. Therefore, a scope is
defined, and any instruction that crosses this scope is considered to be
ACE. For example, if the scope is defined as the CPU-memory interface,
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then all stores to memory are ACE unless demonstrated otherwise. If
the scope is extended to include the memory, such that all operations
crossing the memory-I/O device interface are ACE, it is possible that
instructions and bits that were earlier considered ACE would be un-
ACE. In this dissertation, the scope is defined to be the CPU-memory
interface, using a methodology similar to that used by Mukherjee et al.
[2]. Memory and register dependencies are tracked over a sliding window
of 50,000 instructions to limit the memory requirement of ACE analy-
sis. Each bit is assumed to be ACE unless it can be proven otherwise.
Doubtless, this introduces conservatism to the SER estimated using ACE
Analysis. This limitation is shared with other performance-model based
methodologies such as SoftArch [22].
• Conservatism due to the Microarchitectural Model: Wang et al. [29]
show that AVFs computed using a less detailed performance model may
overestimate the resultant SER by two or three times, as compared to
Statistical Fault Injection (SFI). As a rebuttal, Biswas et al. [30] show
that this detail is easily added, minimizing the overestimation of SER.
Additionally, ACE analyis approximates program behavior in the pres-
ence of faults; faults that change the behavior of the processor are not
modelled. Wang et al. [29] claim that another potential reason for the
overestimation of SER using ACE Analysis may be due to so-called “Y
branches”. In earlier work, Wang et al. [31] report the existence of
branches that may be forced down the wrong path due to a transient
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fault, but would eventually reconverge with the correct path without
affecting the correctness of the output. They refer to such branches as
“Y branches”. ACE analysis conservatively assumes all branches to be
ACE, and will execute correct path instructions. Thus, it does not ac-
count for such behavior. It is expected, however, that such branches are
relatively infrequently observed [18, 30], but can be accounted for using
additional analysis. This limitation is shared with other methodologies,
such as SoftArch [22].
• Sum of Failure Rates: Using SoftArch, Li et al. [28] argue that ACE
analysis will overestimate the SER in systems with an extremely large
number of components (such as tens of thousands of processors), or at
extremely high flux density of particle bombardment (such as in a ra-
diation chamber), or workloads with extremely long phases that are ex-
tremely different from one another. They acknowledge that for typical
applications, ACE analysis provides is accurate. The potential cause of
this discrepency is due to the occurrance of multi-bit faults. A single
entry in a structure may be hit multiple times over its lifetime under
elevated levels of radiation, and ACE analysis is unable to account for
temporal multi-bit faults (a limitation shared with SoftArch). Sum of
Failure Rates assumes that the faults in each structure are independent
of those in other structures. It is possible, however, that faults in mul-
tiple different structures combine to produce only one error. Due to
the propagated fault model used in SoftArch, it is able to account for
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the joint probability of multiple faults affecting a single output value,
whereas Sum of Failure Rates cannot. Nevertheless, for practical pur-
poses, the conservativeness of ACE analysis and sum of failure rates may
be sufficient.
The conservatism of ACE analysis in determining SER is still reason-
able if the designer is interested in bounding SER. ACE analysis is utilized
in this dissertation to estimate the occupancy of corruptible state in the core,
and not to measure the actual SER. For the former purpose, ACE analysis is
accurate. SoftArch, or any other methodology may be used instead of ACE
analysis to achieve the same objectives.
2.7.4 Limitations of SFI
It is also pertinent to note the limitations of more direct methods such
as Statistical Fault Injection using RTL models. SFI overcomes some of the
limitations of ACE analysis, or SoftArch, due to its low-level detail, but in-
troduces some of its own. Due to the onerously long runtimes (orders of
magnitude slower than performance models), and the need to perform mul-
tiple simulations for statistical significance, a workload is simulated only for
1,000 – 10,000 cycles [18]. It often takes much longer for a fault to propagate
to the program output, so that can be confirmed that it will not be masked. In
contrast, microarchitectural models are run for billions of cycles, providing a
better view of this masking effect. Additionally, SFI will run two copies of the
RTL simulation: one fault-free, and the other into which faults are injected,
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and the output is compared to detect the incidence of a fault. At the end of
this relatively short simulation, all mismatches in state, whether architectural
or microarchitectural must be conservatively treated as if they are errors (i.e.,
ACE). Some of these errors may be masked due to future operations in the
workload, but practical limitations obviate the long simulation time required
to establish this fact. SFI may thus be reasonable to conservatively compute
the AVF of structures such as pipeline latches, in which the faults quickly be
propagated to the registers, or get masked. For structures such as caches or
register files in which a faulty value can remain for a long time before man-
ifesting as an error, or being masked, SFI may result in pessimistic results.
As noted earlier, RTL models are available only after the design has been fi-
nalized, and implemented, making it a poor choice for early design planning.
The cost of changing the architecture at this stage to improve reliability may
be excessively high.
2.8 Mechanistic Modeling of CPU Performance
Karkhanis and Smith [32] devise a first-order analytical model for es-
timating the performance of an out-of-order processor, which is refined by
Eyerman et al. [33] using interval analysis. Eyerman et al. [33] report a 7%
error in estimating Cycles Per Instruction (CPI) on a 4-wide machine. Inter-
val analysis models the program execution as an ideal, miss-free execution,
interrupted by miss events that would disrupt the dispatch of instructions, as
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Figure 2.1: Interval Analysis for Modeling Performance.
illustrated in Figure 2.1. In the absence of any miss events, the processor is
able to dispatch instructions at the maximum dispatch rate D1. The stall-free
or ideal execution represents the case in which the processor has no stalls due
to miss events. This dissertation uses the term instruction window to refer to
the instructions in flight, or the ROB. The following discussion is intended to
provide the reader with a basic understanding of Interval Analysis.
Each miss event interrupts the dispatch of instructions until it resolves.
An interval begins with the resolution of an earlier miss event, and ends just
before the resolution of the next miss event, penalizing the performance of the
processor in proportion to its miss penalty. As an out-of-order processor can
extract Memory-Level Parallelism (MLP), and nearly all of the latency of the
overlapped miss is hidden behind that of the non-overlapped data L2/TLB
miss, it is sufficient to count only the non-overlapped data L2 and TLB miss
1Note that D may be less than the peak designed dispatch width if the program lacks
sufficient inherent Instruction Level Parallelism (ILP).
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cycles towards estimating performance, for a given instruction window size.
Shorter latency data cache miss events that cannot individually stall the pro-
cessor, such as a data L1 cache miss that hits in the L2 cache can be modeled in
the same manner as arithmetic instructions. The branch misprediction penalty
for an out-of-order processor is modeled as the sum of the front-end pipeline
depth, and the branch resolution penalty. The branch resolution penalty is
the number of cycles between the mispredicted branch entering the instruction
window, and the misprediction being detected. The following section explains
each event or interval in detail.
2.8.1 Steady State, or Ideal Execution
Given an instruction window of size W , the total number of cycles taken
to execute all instructions in the instruction window is a function of the latency
of executing the critical dependence path. The average critical dependence
path length K(W ) for a given program being executed by a processor with
instruction window size W is modeled as K(W ) = 1
α
W 1/β [32, 34] where α
and β are constants that are determined by fitting the relationship between
K(W ) and W to a power curve. This analysis is performed assuming that all
instructions have unit latency. Therefore, given an average instruction latency
l, the critical path would require l.K(W ) cycles. Using Little’s law, the ideal
Instruction Level Parallelism (ILP), or Instructions Per Cycle (IPC) (i.e., I(W )
) that can be extracted from the program given an instruction window of size
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Setting β to 2 in Equation 2.3, the available ILP for a given workload
has a quadratic relationship with the instruction window size [34]. Earlier
studies by Riseman and Fisher [35] emperically obtain this approximately
quadratic relationship. For the SPEC CPU2006 workloads in this dissertation,
β varies between 1.24 and 2.40. The larger the value of β, the shorter the
critical dependency path K(W ), and greater the available ILP.
The workload is profiled using a functional simulator, over a range of
instruction window sizesW to determine the corresponding critical dependence
path length K(W ). The profiler sweeps over the entire length of the workload
using a sliding window of size Wmax, simultaneously recording statistics for all
instruction window sizes, from 1 to Wmax. This profiling is a one-time effort
for each workload. This relationship between K(W ) and W over a range of
instruction window sizes is fitted to a power curve to obtain α and β.
2.8.2 Non-Overlapped Long-Latency Data Cache Misses
Non-overlapped last-level cache misses or data Translation Lookaside
Buffer (TLB) misses can stall the dispatch of intstructions until they are re-
solved. Each non-overlapped miss blocks the dispatch of instructions for a pe-
riod of time equal to its miss penalty. In order to determine the non-overlapped
last-level data cache or TLB misses, the workload is profiled using a cache sim-
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ulator, over a range of instruction window sizes, in a single pass, using a sliding
window similar to that for estimating K(W ). The number of non-overlapped
data L2 and TLB misses are recorded for each window size. Thus, the profile
only needs to be rerun if the cache hierarchy is changed. Fortunately, the
number of practical cache hierarchies possible is limited.
2.8.3 Branch Misprediction Penalty
Branch misprediction penalty can be considered as the cost of oppor-
tunity of an incorrectly predicted branch. All instructions fetched after the
mispredicted branch are incorrect, and hence the pipeline is flushed after the
branch is detected, and the pipeline is refilled from the correct path. Thus, the
branch misprediction penalty is equal to the sum of the branch resolution time
and the pipeline refill penalty. Pipeline refill penalty is equal to the front-end
pipeline depth. The branch resolution time is the amount of time between
the branch entering the instruction window, and the misprediction being de-
tected. Karkhanis and Smith [32] show that, assuming an earliest-first issue
policy, the mispredicted branch is among the last correct-path instruction to
be executed, and that the impact of issual of wrong-path instructions on the
branch resolution time is minimal. Karkhanis and Smith estimate the branch
resolution time as a leaky bucket algorithm2 in which correct-path instructions
2The leaky-bucket algorithm is so called, because it parallels the behavior of a bucket full
of water with a small hole at the bottom. The pressure at the hole is maximum when the
bucket is full, and hence the volume of water leaving the hole is large. As the bucket drains,
the pressure at the hole decreases, and the volume of flow out of the hole also decreases.
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are continually being drained from the pipeline until the misprediction is de-
tected, triggering a pipeline flush. For a designed dispatch width D, setting
I(W ) = D in Equation 2.3, the number of instructions in flight during ideal








At clock cycle t = 0, when the mispredicted branch instruction enters
the instruction window, there are Wt=0 = W (D) instructions in flight dur-
ing ideal execution. During each subsequent cycle, D instructions are issued,
reducing the number of unissued correct-path instructions in flight, and thus
Wt=1 = Wt=0 −D. The issued instructions will quickly be retired (under the
assumption of ideal, or miss-free execution). Wt=1 is substituted into Equa-
tion 2.3 to determine I(Wt=1). If I(Wt=1) ≥ D, then D more instructions
are issued in the subsequent cycle, and the process repeats. Note that due
to the earliest-first issue policy, correct-path instructions are prioritized to be
issued over wrong-path instructions. At some stage, the number of correct-
path instructions in flight becomes less than the minimum number necessary
to support the designed issue/dispatch width. Therefore, applying the formula
Wt=n+1 = Wt=n −min(D, I(Wt=n)) iteratively until only one correct-path in-
struction remains in the pipeline, the branch misprediction penalty is modeled
using this leaky-bucket algorithm. Eyerman et al. [33] refine this modeling by
considering the clustering of mispredicted branches. A branch misprediction
that occurs immediately after another branch misprediction will have fewer




ideal Steady-state execution, in the absence of instruction-cache misses,
branch mispredictions or long-latency data cache misses
brMp Branch Mispredictions
IL1Miss L1 I-cache misses that hit in L2
IL2Miss I-cache misses that also miss in L2
ITLBMiss ITLB misses
DL2Miss Non-overlapped data L2 cache miss
DTLBMiss Non-overlapped data TLB miss
Table 2.1: Definition of Events for Interval Analysis
misprediction penalty.
Branch misprediction statistics can be computed using a simple branch
predictor profiler. In practice, there only are a limited number of reasonable
branch predictor configurations possible.
2.8.4 Instruction Cache and TLB misses
Instruction cache (I-cache) misses and TLB misses interrupt the dis-
patch of instructions. As the time required to drain the front-end pipeline is
roughly equal to the time required to refill it after the I-cache miss resolves,
the miss penalty of an I-cache or I-TLB miss is equal to its latency. I-cache
and I-TLB miss count can be determined through simple cache simulation.
2.8.5 Estimating Cycles Per Instruction
The total number of cycles for executing a program is modeled as
Ctotal = Cideal + CIL1Miss + CITLBMiss + CbrMp + CDL2Miss + CDTLBMiss. The
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expansions of the abbreviated event names in the subscript can be found in
Table 2.1. Miss events that would not interrupt dispatch, such as data cache
hits, are modeled similar to arithmetic instructions. The model assumes a
balanced microarchitecture design; specifically, that the processor would not
frequently stall in the absence of miss events, while running typical workloads.
Karkhanis and Smith [32], and Eyerman et al. [33] demonstrate that it is
sufficient to model these intervals as being independent of one another, with
little loss in accuracy. This key simplifying assumption does not hold true
for occupancy. For example, a mispredicted branch that is dependent on an
L2 data cache miss significantly reduces the occupancy of correct-path bits in
the shadow of the L2 miss, and is non-trivial to estimate using the existing
interval analysis model or aggregate metrics.
A single profile can be used to perform parametric studies on ROB size,
issue width, and the latencies of instructions, caches, TLBs and main memory.
If the cache hierarchy or the branch predictor is changed, the corresponding
profiler would need to be rerun. As noted earlier, there are only a limited
number of practical cache hierarchies and branch predictors, and once the
database is populated, all estimations of Cycles Per Instruction (CPI) are
nearly instantaneous.
2.9 Related Work
This section contrasts prior attempts at estimating the worst-case SER
due to program execution, with the AVF stressmark generation methodology
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presented in this dissertation. Prior work on modeling the AVF of a mi-
croarchitecture are also presented, and contrasted with the mechanistic model
presented in this dissertation.
2.9.1 Estimating the Worst-Case Observable SER
There has been some prior work on attempting to increase the visibility
of radiation induced faults at the program output. Kellington et al. [36] and
Sanda et al. [37] study the soft-error tolerance of the IBM POWER6 proces-
sor under a radiation beam. They use a proprietary validation software called
Architectural Verification Program (AVP) which injects random instructions
into the core, and detects errors on the fly. They report that AVP injects
roughly 20% un-ACE bits, and mainly exercises the core and not the caches.
Due to the proprietary set-up of AVP, the extent to which it exercises the core
is unkown, but it is reasonable to expect that completely random injection
of instructions, even if they were all ACE, would likely not maximize the cor-
ruptible state resident in the processor.The precise factors affecting occupancy
of state in the processor to estimate the maximum occupancy of corruptible
state is developed and presented in this dissertation. It is therefore extremely
unlikely that AVP would chance upon the exact combination of factors that
maximize the visibility of soft errors. Even with the incorporation of a ma-
chine learning methodology, a systematic approach, such as the one presented
in this dissertation, would be superior in terms of convergence time, and confi-
dence in the result. Circuit level techniques have been proposed, such as work
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by Sanyal et al [38–40]. However, this does not consider the masking effect of
program execution, and cannot be used during the early design stage.
Joshi et al. [41], Polfliet et al. [42], and Ganesan et al. [43, 44] utilize
genetic algorithms to develop stressmarks for power and thermal stressmarks.
Their methodology cannot be directly used for AVF, since it has no means of
capturing ACE and core or cache occupancy. Furthermore, they rely on mi-
croarchitecture independent program characteristics, which are not not useful,
since AVF is strongly dependent on microarchitecture. The AVF stressmark
methodology creates a code generator that is expressly designed for generating
an AVF stressmark, by working from first principles. Consequently, most of
the knobs used, and the nature of the code generator, are significantly different.
Other methodologies to estimate AVF, such as SoftArch [22], or Pro-
gram Vulnerability Factor (PVF) [45] and Hardware Vulnerability Factor (HVF)
[46], may be utilized instead of ACE Analysis, to compute the Soft Error Rate
(SER) of a given microarchitecture. These methodologies by themselves can-
not be used to estimate the worst-case SER, as they are themselves dependent
on workloads, just as is the case with ACE analysis.
2.9.2 Analytical Modeling of AVF and SER
Mukherjee et al. [2] use Little’s Law as a high-level technique to es-
timate occupancy of state in the structure; however, this methodology still
requires detailed simulation to extract the Instructions Per Cycle (IPC) and
the average latency of each correct-path instruction in each structure. Com-
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puting the latter from profiling is non-trivial for an out-of-order processor due
to overlapping of some execution latencies, and dependence on the latencies
of other instructions in that structure. Furthermore, it fails to provide insight
into the fundamental factors affecting the occupancy of correct-path state be-
yond aggregate metrics.
As AVF represents the combined effect of the workload and its inter-
action with the hardware, Sridharan and Kaeli [45] attempt to decouple the
software component of AVF from the hardware component through a micro-
architecture-independent metric called Program Vulnerability Factor (PVF).
PVF has been shown to model the AVF of the Architected Register File using
inexpensive profiling. However, for estimating the AVF of other structures,
their methodology relies on the estimation of Hardware Vulnerability Factor
(HVF) [46], which in turn requires detailed simulation, and thus provides less
insight than a well constructed mechanistic model. Sridharan and Kaeli have
shown that HVF correlates with occupancy of structures such as the ROB,
and hence it is expected that the mechanistic modeling methodology presented
herein can be used to model the HVF of the applicable structures.
Fu et al. [14] report a “fuzzy relationship” between AVF and simple
performance metrics. Therefore, black-box statistical models for AVF that
utilize multiple microarchitectural metrics have been proposed by Walcott et
al. [9] and Duan et al. [10] for dynamic prediction of AVF. These models use
metrics such as average occupancy, and cumulative latencies of instructions in
various structures as inputs to the statistical model. However, these metrics
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are not available without detailed simulation. Cho et al. [11] utilize a neural-
network based methodology for design-space exploration, and use it to model
AVF of the Issue Queue. As each workload is associated with its own neural
network model, training it would potentially require a significant amount of
detailed simulations. All these models combine the software and hardware
component of AVF, and do not uncover the fundamental mechanisms influ-
encing AVF, thereby providing less insight than the approach presented in this
dissertation. As the methodology presented herein derives the factors affect-
ing AVF from first principles that explicity models this fuzzy relationship, it
enables the architect to identify the precise cause of high or low AVF in a




This chapter provides an overview of the simulators, workloads and
evaluation methodology used in this dissertation.
3.1 Simulators
Two simulators that simulate microarchitectures using the Alpha ISA
are used to produce the data presented herein. SimSoda [47] simulator per-
forms ACE analysis and is built on top of the SimAlpha [48] simulator. SimAl-
pha models the Alpha 21264 microarchitecture in great detail, and has been
validated for integer microbenchmarks against an Alpha 21264 processor. How-
ever, it lacks flexibility and models features that are unique to the microar-
chitecture of the Alpha 21264. Therefore, SimpleScalar [49] is used when a
more generic and flexible microarchitecture model is required. SimpleScalar,
however, models the ROB, IQ and RF in a single structure called the Regis-
ter Update Unit (RUU). It also implements a unified Load and Store Queue
(LSQ). As modern microprocessors do not use a unified RUU, instead prefer-
ring a separate ROB, IQ and register file, the simulator needs modification to
be representative of current microarchitectures. Additionally, many microar-
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chitectures implement a separate load queue and store queue. The results
presented in this disseration using SimpleScalar are generated using a modi-
fied version of the simulator that implements separate ROB, IQ, RF, LQ and
SQ.
3.2 ACE Analysis
In order to compute the AVF of a structure using ACE analysis on a
performance simulator using Equation 2.2, the performance simulator must
provide the sum of residence cycles for ACE bits in that structure, the total
number of elapsed cycles of execution, and the total number of bits in the
structure. Performance models provide the total number of elapsed cycles,
and the number of bits in the structure is known at design time. Therefore,
ACE analysis only requires the additional task of computing the residence
cycles of ACE bits in the structure.
In order to determine the residency of ACE bits in the structure, the
performance simulator counts the number of cycles for which an instruction is
resident in the structure. The instruction may then be committed eventually,
or quashed as a result of a misprediction. If the instruction is committed, it is
put into a post-commit analysis window that tracks whether the instruction is
dynamically dead, or is logically masked. This post-commit analysis window
may be thousands of instructions in size; a window size of 50,000 instructions is
assumed. Mukherjee [18] states that a window of a few thousand instructions
is sufficient to capture most of the dynamically dead instructions, and logical
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masking.
The post-commit analysis window maintains a list of instructions to be
analyzed, along with their corresponding per-structure residence cycle counts,
and a table specifying producers and consumers of each instruction within
the analysis window. Instructions are inserted into the analysis window at
commit-time in program order, and instructions that are older than the size
of the analysis window are removed. When a dynamically dead instruction is
found, all instructions that exclusively depend on dynamically dead instruc-
tions are also marked dynamically dead. Instructions that are removed from
the analysis window are then checked for ACE-ness; if they were not dynami-
cally dead or masked, the residence cycle count for each structure is added to
the ACE cycle counter corresponding to that structure. Thus, the methodol-
ogy assumes that each instruction is ACE unless it can be proven otherwise.
Additional detail may also be added to ACE analysis at the bit level granu-
larity, for increased accuracy. For example, branch instructions do not require
a destination register specifier, and thus, the fields in the ROB that corre-
spond to the destination register specifier are not ACE. As discussed earlier
in Chapter 2, addition of such detail reduces the overestimation of AVF [30].
3.3 Genetic Algorithm
Genetic Algorithms (GA) are global optimization heuristics used to find
optimal solutions to complex problems. Genetic algorithms mimic biological
systems in nature. Using the principles of natural selection, biological systems
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seek to improve the quality of their gene pool. Genetic algorithms similarly
evolve an optimal solution from a set of random values, or initial seed values.
Each set of values is called an individual, and each individual is composed
of multiple “genes”. Each gene influences an aspect, or part, of the overall
solution. A string of genes are collecively referred to as a chromosome for
the individual. A set of individuals together constitute a generation of the
population. The individuals in the generation are evaluated for fitness; for
example, if the objective is to maximize a function, then individuals that
produce higher values for the function are more fit. Fitter individuals are given
a higher probability to propagate their genes. Conversely, unfit individuals are
less likely to be selected for breeding, and will likely die out. A whole new
population of solutions is thus generated by mating the highly fit individuals
of the current generation with each other.
Just like in biological systems, individuals in each generation are “repro-
duced” or “cross-bred” by combining parts of the genes of the two individuals
to produce a new individual. This process is referred to as crossover. Two
individual chromosomes are cut at a random location, producing head and tail
chromosomes. The tails of the two individuals are swapped to produce two
new individuals, each containing some genes from each parent. Crossover is
not applied to every pair of individuals selected for mating; rather, a random
choice is made to perform reproduction, with a probability of between 0.6 and
1 [50]. If a crossover is not performed, the offspring are simply duplicates
of their parents, giving each individual a chance of propagating their genes
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without any crossover. Additionally, to avoid being stuck in local maxima or
minima, the genetic algorithm also introduces “mutation”, which involves the
introduction of random changes to genes in an individual. The probability of
mutation is selected to be less than 0.05, to avoid excessively random varia-
tions in population, and allow for a gradual evolution of a solution through
reproduction (i.e., crossover). As the population matures, the average fitness
of the population begins to approach the most fit individual found thus far.
A gene is said to have converged when 95% of the population shares the same
values. A population converges when all the genes have also converged. To
further avoid being stuck in local maxima or minima, the GA may introduce
cataclysmic events. During a cataclysm, the best solution in the population
is selected, and placed in a completely new population of randomly seeded
individuals, and the process is restarted.
Genetic Algorithms (GA) have been shown to successfully deal with a
wide range of problem areas, that are particularly difficult to solve using other
methods [50]. GA’s are not guaranteed to produce the absolute global opti-
mum solution to a given problem. Nevertheless, they are good at finding sat-
isfactorily good solutions, acceptably quickly with little intervention. Genetic
algorithms to maximize the occupancy of state in the core are utilized. This
involves complex tuning of program characteristics that cannot be expressed in
a manner that is amenable to mathematical optimization techniques, making
the GA an ideal candidate for such optimizations. This dissertation uses the
IBM SNAP Genetic Algorithm, obtained under NDA for university research.
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3.4 Evaluation Methodology
The methodologies presented in this dissertation are evaluated using
SPEC [51] CPU2006 benchmark suite, and MiBench [52] benchmark suite.
SPEC CPU2006 is an industry standard benchmark suite for comparing the
performance of high performance processors, and has a large memory footprint.
MiBench is a benchmark suite used to evaluate embedded system processors
and has a small memory footprint. Consequently, SPEC CPU2006 workloads
have dynamic instruction counts of trillions of instructions, whereas MiBench
workloads have dynamic instruction counts of millions of instructions. The
working set, and typically, the memory footprint, of MiBench workloads fits
in the last-level cache of high performance processors, which is not the case
for many SPEC CPU2006 workloads.
Owing to the large dynamic instruction count of SPEC CPU2006 work-
loads, it is impractical to run the entire workload on a performance simulator.
Therefore, it is necessary to be able to run representative traces of the work-
load. The SimPoint [53] methodology was devised to address the issue of
identifying representative traces. The workload is broken into equal intervals
of execution. Each interval is profiled to identify constituent basic blocks. A
basic block is a region of execution of code that has exactly one control flow
entry and exit. Simpoint profiling identifies the basic blocks in each chunk of
execution, to produce a basic block vector. Using machine learning, SimPoints
methodology clusters these basic block vectors based on their similarity to one
another, and picks a representative interval from each cluster. Clusters are
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assigned weights based on the number of intervals contained in each. Each
representative interval is run on a performance simulator, and the relevant
statistics are collected. A weighted average of the relevant statistics provides
an accurate estimation of the same statistics obtained using a complete run of
the workload. A single representative interval may also be picked using this
methodology; this is called Single SimPoints. Single SimPoints methodology
is used to evaluate SPEC CPU2006 workloads. The interval size is chosen to
be 100M instructions, as proposed in the original SimPoint work [53].
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Chapter 4
An Automated Methodology for Bounding
Microprocessor Vulnerability to Soft Errors
In this Section, an automated methodology for bounding microproces-
sor vulnerability to soft errors is presented. Starting from the first principles
of superscalar execution, a set of microarchitecture-dependent characteristics
that maximize the occupancy of state in the major structures of the processor
is identified. A code generator that manipulates these characteristics based
on its inputs, or “knobs” is developed, and interfaced with a machine learn-
ing algorithm in a closed-loop feedback process. Upon the convergence of the
machine learning algorithm, the workload generated by the code generator is
shown to induce significantly higher Soft Error Rate (SER) than the highest
SPEC CPU2006 or MiBench workload.
The significant contributions of this work are as follows:
1. A flexible and automated methodology to generate an AVF stressmark is
developed. This AVF stressmark is designed to approach the maximum
observable SER for a given microarchitecture.
2. The deficiencies in current methodologies for the estimation of the ob-
servable worst-case SER are highlighted. Also highlighted are the poten-
52
tial pitfalls of soft-error reliability design without the knowledge of the
observable worst-case SER. The knowledge of the observable worst-case
SER enables designers to quantify design trade-offs such that their SER
design objectives can be met efficiently.
4.1 Issues affecting SER benchmarking
Prior research [2, 8] has shown that masking effects of program behavior
have a significant impact on the visibility of faults to the user. Architected
Vulnerability Factor (AVF) modeling, which quantifies this masking effect,
enables architects to determine the highest per-structure SER observed while
running typical workloads. The observable SER of a workload is strongly
dependent on the microarchitecture and underlying circuit-level fault rates.
Different programs stress microarchitectural structures differently, and hence
a change in microarchitecture or underlying fault rate alters their observed
SER by different proportions. A workload suite that offers adequate coverage
on one microarchitecture and circuit-level fault-rate does not neccessarily do
so when either factor is changed.
There is no known methodology to ensure that the benchmark suite
covers the entire range of observable SER, from zero to the worst-case ob-
servable SER. Therefore, architects run a large number of programs in the
hope that sufficient coverage is achieved. Architects choose the SER design
objective appropriate for the usage environment, such as design for the aver-
age workload-induced SER, or for the highest workload-induced SER. A safety
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margin is added to determine the design point, to cover for the possibility of
inadequate SER coverage and representativeness of the workload suite [12].
The choice of this safety margin is largely based on designer intuition, and it
is difficult to know whether it is adequate. Figure 1.1 represents two workload
scenarios with different SER coverages. The arrows represent the range of SER
observed while running programs in the workload suites. The workload suite
in scenario 1 has good SER coverage, whereas the workload suite in scenario
2 does not. Suppose that the architect is designing for the highest workload-
induced SER. As shown in Figure 1.1, the addition of the safety margin to the
highest workload-induced SER pushes the design point well beyond the worst-
case observable SER, leading to over-design. On the other hand, the safety
margin for scenario 2 is insufficient to cover for the worst-case. In the absence
of a methodology for determining the worst-case SER, it is impossible to know
whether these safety margins are excessive, or inadequate. On similar lines,
the architect may choose to design for the average-case workload, or some per-
centile of the workload suite. Consider Scenario 1 which has a relatively high
average SER. An aggressive safety margin over the average case in Scenario
1 may push the design point close to, or beyond the worst-case SER, leading
to over-design. On the other hand, an aggressive safety margin is required in
Scenario 2 to cover for its lack of adequate SER coverage. The knowledge of
the worst-case SER allows thus the architect to rationalize about the amount
of the safety margin necessary, and define the design point relative to the
worst-case SER and the design objective. The knowledge of the worst-case
54
SER also indicates whether the workload suite needs additional benchmarks
to make up for its lack of SER coverage. It is expected that designing for
the worst-case SER will increase in significance in future technologies, due to
elevated levels of SER as a result of aggressive lowering of operating voltages
to reduce power consumption.
4.2 Difficulties in determining the worst-case SER
It is impossible for every bit in the processor to simultaneously have
100% AVF while running a program: structures in processors are typically
over-designed to handle bursty program behavior, and have interdependencies
such that all of them cannot contain useful program state simultaneously.
This suggests that the overall worst-case SER calculated by adding up circuit-
level fault rates of individual circuits, without considering the masking effect
of program behavior would lead to an overly pessimistic design. For similar
reasons, it would be incorrect to estimate the worst-case by adding up the
highest per-structure SER observed using AVF modeling.
Therefore, there is a need to determine the highest observable SER
in a holistic manner. A workload that exposes this highest observable SER
is referred to as a stressmark, drawing an analogy with power or thermal
stressmarks (also called viruses), which are designed to maximize power and
temperature of the processor, respectively. As every gate in the circuit cannot
be toggling simultaneously, the power or thermal virus focusses on instructions
that maximize overall power dissipation or temperature.
55
Parameter Baseline
Integer ALUs 4, 1 cycle latency, 64 bit wide
Integer Multiplier 1, 7 cycle latency, 64 bit wide
Fetch/slot/map/issue/commit 4/4/4/4/4 per cycle
Integer Issue Queue 20 entries, 32 bits/entry
ROB 80 entries, 76 bits/entry
Integer rename register file 80, 64 bits/register
LQ/SQ 32 entries each, 128 bits/entry
Branch Predictor Hybrid, 4K global, 2 level 1K local
4K choice
Branch Misprediction Penalty 7 cycles
L1 I-cache 64kB, 2-way, 64B line, 1 cycle latency
L1 D cache 64kB, 2-way, 64B line, 3 cycle latency
DTLB 256 entry, fully associative, 8kB page
L2 cache 1MB, direct mapped, 7 cycle latency
Table 4.1: Baseline Configuration of Processor.
A comprehensive methodology that simultaneously increases the AVF
of multiple structures in the processor such that the observable SER ap-
proaches the maximum is developed herein. The search space for such a
program is large and complex. Starting from first-principles, a set of mi-
croarchitecture dependent factors that affect the occupancy of useful state in
the processor is derived, and used to develop a code generator that defines a
feasible search space. A Genetic Algorithm (GA) to explore this search space
and generate the stressmark is then used. When the GA has converged, the re-
sulting workload will induce an SER that approaches the maximum observable
SER.
56
Interdependence of the AVF of Processor Structures
Occupancy, and hence AVF of structures in an OoO processor are not
completely independent of one another. This interdependence also ensures
that all bits in the processor cannot be ACE simultaneously.
Consider the Alpha 21264 whose configuration is outlined in Table 4.1.
Every instruction in the ReOrder Buffer (ROB) must exist in either the Issue
Queue (IQ), Load Queue (LQ) or Store Queue (SQ), or have been executed in
the Function Units (FU). However, the total number of entries in the integer
IQ, LQ and SQ alone is more than the size of the ROB, implying that the
ROB, IQ, LQ, SQ and FU cannot simultaneously have 100% AVF.
The number of rename registers in use depends on the number of in-
structions in flight, and hence the occupancy of the ROB. Unlike architected
registers, rename registers cannot hold ACE data all the time. Many rename
registers hold values that are quickly consumed, and not read again. The
process of retiring, releasing, re-assigning and writing to a rename register
file takes multiple cycles, and hence AVF of the physical register file is never
100%. Additionally, stores and branch instructions do not write ACE data to
a rename register.
The interdependence in occupancy also implies that assuming that the
instantaneous occupancy of ROB and IQ, and the Instruction mix (I-mix)
are known, the occupancy/utilization of LQ, SQ, FU and rename RF can be
bounded, thereby bounding AVF. Additional information about the proportion
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of ACE instructions in each type (load, store, arithmetic) allows a tighter
bound on AVF.
FU utilization is maximum when the processor can issue arithmetic
instructions at maximum bandwidth. However, LQ and SQ occupancy will be
lower, since the instruction mix has fewer loads and stores.
The Alpha 21264 also allows only two memory instructions to issue per
cycle, restricting the rate at which they can be filled with ACE bits.
It is clear from the above example that simply adding the circuit-level
fault rates of individual structures, or the highest per-structure SER, to cal-
culate worst-case SER would be incorrect. This is generally true of any other
microarchitecture as well. There is therefore a need for a methodology that
addresses the issue of quantifying the observable worst-case SER.
4.3 Design of the Code Generator
In this section, the methodology used to build a code generator for AVF
stressmarks is described. This code generator must be provided with knobs to
control various parameters. The knobs are used to interface the code generator
with a Genetic Algorithm (GA) tool, which then controls the characteristics of
the output program. Figure 4.1 outlines the framework for stressmark creation.
In the first step, the Genetic Algorithm produces a set of knob values, that is
used by the code generator to create a candidate stressmark. In the next step,
this candidate stressmark is compiled and run on a simulator for measuring
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Figure 4.1: Methodology for creation of an AVF stressmark.
AVF. In the following step, the output of the simulator is evaluated by a fitness
function, which evaluates whether the output has converged. The result is fed
back into the GA, and the above steps will be repeated until convergence is
achieved, or a maximum number of runs are reached. Additionally, the code
generator must ensure that every instruction is ACE so that entries in the core
and cache are also ACE. In order to define the knobs for the code generator, the
microarchitecture-dependent program characteristics that affect occupancy in
cores and caches are studied.
Microarchitectural structures are classified into Queueing Structures
(QS) and storage structures. For queueing structures such as the IQ, LQ,
SQ, ROB, and FU, the AVF is proportional to occupancy, if the proportion
of ACE bits in the program is kept fixed. This correlation between AVF
and occupancy has been utilized to predict AVF of such structures [9, 10].
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For storage structures, overall occupancy does not necessarily correlate to
AVF, since data in cache lines may switch between being ACE and un-ACE,
depending on access patterns. For caches, AVF is influenced by the working
set size [27] and coverage of cache locations.
4.3.1 AVF due to Microarchitecture-Dependent Behavior
The factors that affect the overall occupancy of queuing structures, and
liveness of caches are also to be considered while designing the code generator.
For the discussion below, assume that the instruction stream has a constant
proportion of ACE bits. This analysis is used to determine the factors that
are required to be controlled in a code generator that increases AVF in a core.
4.3.1.1 Long-Latency Operations
A long-latency operation, such as an L2 or DTLB miss, double-precision
divide, or square root may cause the processor to eventually stall (if their
latencies are not overlapped with another long-latency operation). Consider
the example of an L2 miss. Typically, in the shadow of an L2 miss, the ROB
fills up completely, and all FU activity ceases eventually. The IQ contains
instructions dependent on the L2 miss. The LQ data array corresponding to
an issued load contains ACE bits only after the data has been brought from
the memory hierarchy; until then, only the tag array holds ACE bits.
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4.3.1.2 ILP and instruction latency
Low ILP and/or higher instruction latency increases the occupancy of
the IQ. Higher instruction latency increases the occupancy of ROB, LQ and
SQ, provided that the IQ is not full. Since FUs have fixed latencies, the only
way to increase occupancy is through maximum IPC (high bandwidth, per
Little’s law).
4.3.1.3 Instruction Mix
Instructions in the ROB are distributed among the FUs, LQ and SQ,
and an increase in one type of instruction will cause an increase the average
occupancy of its corresponding unit, and a proportionate decrease in the oc-
cupancy of the others. The size of operands used also affects the ACE-ness of
entries in the load queue, store queue and register file. For instance, a 32-bit
store instruction on a 64-bit machine would have the other 32-bits as un-ACE,
thereby lowering its AVF [2]. As the LQ and SQ typically contain more bits
than function units, programs that have a greater proportion of loads and
stores will have more corruptible state in the processor, all else being equal.
4.3.1.4 Front-End Misses
I-cache misses, I-TLB misses and fetch inefficiency reduce AVF of all
structures by reducing the supply of useful instructions. In the case of a branch
misprediction, all instructions fetched along the wrong path are un-ACE, and
the subsequent pipeline flush reduces the occupancy of the queues.
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4.3.1.5 Cache Coverage and Working Set
The AVF of a cache depends on the number of cache lines that contain
ACE data, and the duration for which the lines are ACE [27]. A high number
of accesses to a few cache lines will give a high hit rate, but low AVF. On
the other hand, a high miss rate could also result in high AVF, if the evicted
lines, and the filled lines replacing them are ACE. The working set may also
be fragmented due to the cache line; a strided access pattern may not use
every memory location in the cache line, and hence only a part of the line will
contain ACE bits.
Additionally, the compiler introduces un-ACE instructions such as NOPs
for alignment of loops to cache line boundaries, prefetches to reduce L2 miss
penalty, and dynamically dead instructions. AVF is sensitive to the compiler
used, and aggressiveness of compilation options. For an AVF stressmark, all
un-ACE instructions should be eliminated.
It may be clear that occupancy, and hence the vulnerability to soft
errors is super-linear in the number of ACE instructions in flight. Intuitively,
any program that does not have a high proportion of branch mispredictions,
has a high proportion of loads and stores, and a high miss rate in the cache
would have high occupancy. The above insights are used to derive a code
generator.
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4.3.2 Design of the Code Generator
The knobs required for the code generator are derived using the insights
outlined in Section 4.3.1. The code generator must allocate a large enough
memory region such that every line in the data caches and DTLB are covered.
High AVF of caches is ensured by performing ACE loads and stores such that
every cache line is 100% ACE (other strategies are possible). Simultaneously,
high DTLB AVF is ensured by requiring the loads and stores to cover every line
in the DTLB without evictions (read to evict is un-ACE). A code generator
based on the framework outlined in Figure 4.1 is implemented. The code
generator must be provided with the size of the ROB, and the caches, of the
particular microarchitecture.
Using a strided load in the inner loop, that will miss in the L2 cache,
and is dependent on itself (pointer chasing) avoids any Memory-Level Paral-
lelism for the L2 misses. Ideally, having the size of the inner loop equal to the
size of the ROB minimizes the number of L2 misses in the ROB, while also
maximizing the number of instructions in the shadow of the L2 miss. As the
loop gets larger than the ROB size, fewer instructions occur in the shadow of
the L2 miss. The code generator is allowed to determine the size of the loop,
but its maximum size is restricted to 1.2× the size of the ROB. Separately,
another code generator framework is implemented in which the L2 miss is
converted into an L2 hit, keeping the rest of the requirements the same. This
models the case of L2 miss-free behavior. The code generator then fills up the
inner loop (see Figure 4.1) with ACE instructions as specified using param-
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eterizable knobs derived from the characteristics summarized under section
4.3.1, below:
1. I-mix : The fraction of loads, stores and arithmetic instructions are spec-
ified using this knob. This determines the occupancy of LQ, SQ and FU
respectively.
2. Dependency distance: This knob controls the number of instructions be-
tween two dependent instructions and affects placement of instructions.
Dependency distance has been used as a microarchitecture-independent
metric for ILP [54, 55]. The code generator interleaves dependence chains
to meet this requirement.
3. Fraction of Long-Latency Arithmetic: This knob controls the mix of
long-latency and short-latency arithmetic instructions. This affects the
average latency of each instruction and hence the issue rate.
4. Average Dependence Chain Length: This controls the average length
of the instruction chain dependent on a load, leading up to a store.
This knob affects the ILP. This is implemented by having a knob that
specifies the fraction of arithmetic instructions that are to be transitively
dependent on loads. These instructions are distributed uniformly over
all loads, and chain loads to available stores.
5. Register Usage: This knob affects the proportion of Reg-Reg vs. imme-
diate instructions, and hence determines the number of register values
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that are ACE.
6. Instructions Dependent on L2 Miss: This knob controls the number of
instructions occupying the IQ in the shadow of the L2 miss.
7. Random seed: This knob is passed to a random number generator that
randomizes the placement of long-latency vs. short latency instructions
in the code. This is used to discover the best code schedule.
8. Code Generator Switch: This switches between the code generators with
and without L2 misses.
Every value that is loaded or produced must transitively produce a value that
is stored to memory, to ensure 100% ACE-ness of instructions and data. Also,
stored results must not overwritten before they are read. The code generator
produces code in C, with embedded Alpha assembly instructions. Assembly
instructions are used to precisely control the output of some of the above
knobs.
Unique Requirements of the Code Generator: The requirement of
100% ACE instructions, and increasing susceptible state in the processor are
two factors that distinguish this effort from typical functional verification, test-
ing methodologies or power viruses. Functional verification or testing empha-
sizes on bug or defect coverage without any regard to ACE-ness or susceptible
state resident in the processor. Therefore, functional verification tools may not
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achieve as high AVF as the AVF stressmark methodology, or may require an
unreasonably large number of random runs (if not directed) to achieve such
high AVF. There is no correlation between power and state resident in the
core. For example, long-latency stalls increase AVF, but provide opportuni-
ties to reduce core power using clock and/or power gating. Power dissipation
is typically maximized when the processor is able to issue multiple arithmetic
instructions at full bandwidth, but this typically implies that the occupancy of
other queues are less than 100%. Furthermore, un-ACE instructions consume
power but do not contribute to AVF. Thus, power viruses are unlikely to be
high AVF workloads, by design. Deriving the properties that affect AVF from
first principles allows the architect to restrict the search space by disallowing
infeasible solutions, and to allow a quick generation of a high-AVF stressmark.
4.4 Framework for the Generation of the AVF Stress-
mark
The search space for an AVF stressmark, despite the pruning performed
while creating the code generator, remains complex. As seen in the discussion
in Section 4.2, the task of creating the optimal instruction schedule that sat-
isfies the constraints of a microarchitecture, while simultaneously increasing
SER is non-trivial. Therefore, utilizing a a Genetic Algorithm (GA) auto-
mates the exploration of the search space defined above. A Genetic Algorithm
is evolutionary machine learning methodology which is often used to find “ap-
proximately optimal” solutions to complex optimization problems. The GA
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initially starts from a set of random solutions. For each solution, a fitness
value is computed, and the best results form the baseline for future genera-
tions. The GA applies mutation, crossover and migration to these solutions,
to generate a new solution. Mutation involves random changes to the solution,
crossover involves swapping parts of existing solutions to create offspring gen-
erations whereas migration involves changing the population of the solution.
When the solutions in a generation converge, the GA introduces a cataclysmic
event, to completely change the population of the best known solution and
avoid being stuck in a local maxima or minima. The GA continues with the
process of creating new generations until no further improvement is reported.
The use of a machine learning algorithm such as GA reduces the de-
pendence on a designer’s intimate knowledge of the microarchitecture while
creating the stressmark. The IBM SNAP genetic algorithm framework, ob-
tained under NDA for university research, is used to create the knob values for
the code generator, as outlined in Figure 4.1. The output of the code generator
is compiled and run on the AVF simulator (outlined below). The results are
used to calculate the fitness metric (SER), which is fed back to the GA, to
create future generations.
4.5 Evaluation Methodology
The methodology is evaluated on a modified version of SimSoda [47],
which computes AVF using the ACE analysis methodology proposed by Mukher-
jee et al. [2] and Biswas et al. [27]. Simsoda is based on SimAlpha [48], which
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models an Alpha 21264 (EV6) in great detail. SimAlpha models the Integer
IQ and Floating Point IQ as separate structures. The experiments presented
herein concentrate on the integer pipeline, for parity with SPEC CPU2006
integer results. The methodology, however, is general enough to be trivially
extended to include the FP pipeline. As presented in Figure 4.1, the GA
generates knobs that are provided as inputs to the code generator. The code
generator produces the corresponding output, and is run on the SimSoda sim-
ulator.
The Genetic Algorithm (GA) runs for 50 generations, with 50 individ-
uals per generation (a total of 2,500 runs), and the best result is picked as the
stressmark. The stressmark is executed for 100M instructions. The stressmark
is compared with 11 CPU2006 Integer Workloads and 10 CPU2006 FP work-
loads. The remaining workloads in the SPEC CPU2006 suite did not compile
successfully due to compiler issues. A single simulation point of length 100M
instructions is identified, using the SimPoint methodology [53], and used for
a detailed simulation at this simulation point. The stressmark results are also
compared with 12 MiBench [52] programs, for diversity of workloads in the
workload suite. The stressmark and all the benchmarks were compiled using
gcc version 4.1 with the -O2 flag. The probability of mutation is set as 0.05
and a crossover rate as 0.73 in the GA, based on recommended ranges from
literature, such as Grefenstette [56], and Srinivas and Patnaik [57]. The choice
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Figure 4.2: Comparison between the overall SER induced by the Stressmark
and CPU2006 workloads on the core and caches for the Baseline Configuration.
4.6 Results
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 represent the overall SER of the architecture
specified in Table 4.1, which is called the Baseline Configuration. It is assumed
that the circuit-level fault rate of the underlying circuits is 1 unit/bit. This is
an arbitrary unit, since only the relative magnitude is of importance for the
methodology. The SER of Queuing Structures (QS), Queuing Structures and
the Register File (QS+RF), DL1+DTLB, and L2 are presented separately, as
caches have significantly more bits than the core, and would dominate all SER
computation. The SER values reported are normalized by dividing them by
the total number of bits in that class of structure, in the interest of clarity.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison between the overall SER induced by the Stressmark
and MiBench workloads on the core and caches for the Baseline Processor
Configuration.
total number of bits in them.
Analysis
Figure 4.4(a) shows the final parameters generated by the GA as the op-
timal solution. The generated code utilizes every architected register, thereby
maintaining high ACE in the Architected RF, by utilizing the appropriate
number of reg-reg instructions. The GA selects short dependence chains to
control ILP and hence occupancy of IQ, and a loop size almost equal to the
size of the ROB. Figure 4.4(b) shows the convergence of Fitness Function for
each generation, averaged over the 50 individuals per generation. The abrupt
drop in the Average Fitness Function at generation 30 is due to a cataclysm
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(b) Convergence of GA
Figure 4.4: Stressmark generated by the Genetic Algorithm for the Baseline
Processor Configuration.
from generation 29 is moved into a new population of random mutations, and
the process is repeated. At the end of 50 generations (2,500 runs), the GA has
converged. Six individuals are run in parallel to speed up the process. The
overall execution time for creating this stressmark is roughly 48 hours.
The stressmark induces an SER of 0.797 units/bit, 0.997 units/bit and
0.931 units/bit in queues, DL1+DTLB and L2, respectively. Workload 403.gcc
induces the highest overall SER (core+cache) of all the workloads in Figure
4.2 and Figure 4.3. Compared to this, the stressmark induces over 2× higher
SER in QS+RF, and DL1+DTLB, and around 1.5× higher SER in L2. The
AVF of individual structures while running the benchmarks is also captured
at a granularity of 50,000 instructions. It is found that the stressmark is
significantly higher than the AVF of such short traces as well. However, using
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short traces may not give sufficient number of instructions for accurate ACE
analysis, and may be pessimistic.
The Alpha 21264 has a separate 2-issue FP pipeline, in addition to
the 4-issue integer pipeline. As FP programs are able to issue more instruc-
tions than integer programs, the SER of queuing structures in SPEC CPU2006
FP workloads is relatively high, compared to SPEC CPU2006 integer work-
loads. The stressmark has much higher vulnerable bits than 459.GemsFDTD
or 434.zeusmp, in the core or caches. The SER induced by MiBench workloads
is low.
The highest instantaneous SER in the core would occur when the 80
entries in the ROB are distributed as 32 entries in each of the LQ and SQ,
and 16 in the IQ. At this instant, AVF of FU would be 0%. The instantaneous
worst-case occupancy for queuing structures, in the shadow of an L2 miss, is
0.899 units/bit (as compared to 0.797 units/bit for the stressmark). As RF
AVF depends on the duration between production and consumption, it is dif-
ficult to estimate its AVF this way. Any processor making forward progress
will have decreased occupancy just after the blocking L2 miss retires, and the
ROB filling up completely in the shadow of the next L2 miss. Constraints such
as the restriction on the number of loads and stores per cycle, and the load
latency, and data dependencies required to maintain ACE-ness affect overall
occupancy of a real program. Therefore, it is clear that the stressmark achieves
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(c) AVF of MiBench Workloads
Figure 4.5: AVF of queuing and storage structures for SPEC CPU2006 and









































(b) SER for workloads on Configuration with Error Detection and Recovery (EDR)
Figure 4.6: SER induced on Processor Configurations RHC and EDR, by
workloads from SPEC CPU2006 and MiBench.
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sible to positively prove that the stressmark induces the absolute, sustainable
maximum SER (a problem shared with power and thermal viruses). It is for
this reason that the ability of the GA to optimize for such a complex solution
space is leveraged. The convergence of the GA, and low difference between an
idealized, “back of the envelope” calculation of instantaneous maximum SER
and the stressmark-induced SER provides confidence that the SER induced
by the stressmark is very near the maximum.
Figures 4.5 presents the AVF of SPEC CPU2006 and MiBench bench-
marks on the baseline configuration, on individual structures. In contrast with
SPEC CPU2006, the AVF stressmark for this microarchitecture achieves much
higher AVF on all the structures, with the exception of FUs and in some cases,
RF.
4.6.1 Stressmark generation for different circuit-level fault rates
The task of manually generating a stressmark when the circuit-level
fault rates are not the same is even more challenging. For the GA, how-
ever, it is only a matter of changing the fitness function to reflect the new
values. In this section, stressmarks are generated for two configurations for
the same microarchitecture in Table 4.1 but different underlying fault rates
outlined in Figure 4.7(a). Unchanged fault rates in DL1, DTLB and L2 are
assumed. Consider the case in which the ROB, LQ and SQ are protected us-
ing Radiation-Hardened Circuitry (RHC), and a case in which these structures
are protected using Error Detection and Recovery (EDR). Circuit-level fault
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rates of structures are not publicly available, so the failure rates assumed are
arbitrary. These assumed failure rates are still useful for demonstrating the
effectiveness of the AVF stressmark methodology.
Configuration RHC: In the case of Config RHC, the IQ and RF are more
vulnerable than the ROB, LQ and SQ. The methodology compensates by
trading off some AVF in the less vulnerable units, to drive up the AVF of IQ
and RF, and hence overall SER. The GA thus attempts to find a point where
all trade-offs put together maximize the fitness function. This comparison is
presented in Figure 4.7(d). Comparing Figure 4.7(b) to Figure 4.4(a), it is seen
that the GA chooses fewer loads and stores, very short dependency distance
and longer average dependence chain length. This reduces ILP and increases
the occupancy of the IQ. Since this setting uses more arithmetic instructions,
the fraction of reg-reg instructions required to use all architected registers is
reduced. The GA selects an instruction schedule such that the overall SER
for this new configuration approaches the maximum. Figure 4.6(a) presents
the SER of the core of SPEC CPU2006 and MiBench programs. The AVF
stressmark induces a significantly higher SER than any SPEC CPU2006 or
MiBench programs.
Configuration EDR: As the AVF of the ROB, LQ and SQ are zero, the
observable SER in the shadow of an L2 miss is relatively low. The GA therefore
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(d) AVF of queuing structures
Figure 4.7: Results of AVF Stressmark Methodology on different circuit-level
fault rates.
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need for maintaining AVF of the caches. As there are no long-latency stalls,
IPC is higher and hence FU AVF is higher. The turn-around time between
releasing and re-assigning a renamed register is significantly decreased and
hence RF AVF is higher. Simultaneously, the AVF of the IQ is also increased
through longer dependence chains. Figure 4.7(d) represents the results of
running Configuration EDR. As expected, AVF of FU and RF are driven
high, at the cost of LQ and SQ occupancy. Figure 4.6(b) presents the SER
induced by the workload suite on Configuration EDR. In this case too, the
SER induced by the AVF stressmark exceeds that of any other program in
the workload suite. It is thus demonstrated that the code-generator and GA
methodology is flexible enough to adapt to such that overall error rate is
increased.
4.6.2 Stressmark generation for a different microarchitecture
For completeness, a stressmark (Stressmark:LargeROB) for a 4-issue
OoO processor with a larger IQ, ROB and rename register file in the core, and
a larger DTLB and L2 cache and latency (Configuration:LargeROB), outlined
in Table 4.2, is created. Figure 4.8 details the overall SER of Configurations
Baseline and LargeROB, in which all structures are assumed to have the same
circuit-level fault rate of 1 unit/bit. Further, assume that the sizes of each
entry in the queuing structures of LargeROB are the same as the Baseline
Configuration. In order to increase the AVF of the relatively larger IQ, the
GA picks a shorter dependency distance, and much more instructions depen-
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Parameter Configuration:LargeROB
Integer ALUs 4, 1 cycle latency
Integer Multiplier 4, 7 cycle latency
Fetch/slot/map/issue/commit 4/4/4/4/4 per cycle
Issue queue 32 entries
ROB 96 entries
Integer rename register file 96
LQ/SQ size 32 entries
Branch Predictor Hybrid, 4K global, 2 level 1K local,
4K choice
L1 I cache 64kB, 2-way, 64B line, 1 cycle latency
L1 D cache 64kB, 4-way, 64B line, 3 cycle latency
D TLB 512 entry, fully associative
L2 cache 2MB, 8 way, 12 cycle latency
Table 4.2: Alternate configuration for evaluating the stressmark creation
methodology
dent on the L2 miss. The RF AVF is relatively lower, because the size of
the architected register stays the same, but the number of rename registers
increases. Thus, the methodology is flexible enough to automatically adapt to
different microarchitectures.
4.7 Implications of the AVF Stressmark Methodology
on Design
The stressmark methodology can be used by architects to evaluate the
impact of design choices for reducing SER of their design. This discussion

























(a) AVF of queuing structures
Parameter Value
Loop Size 91
No. of loads 29
No. of stores 29
No. of Independent 
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(b) Knobs for final GA
solution
Figure 4.8: AVF of queueing and storage structures for Configura-
tion:LargeROB.
the methodology clearly induces very high AVF on the caches. The overall
SER induced in the core by the stressmark for the Baseline, RHC and EDR
configurations is presented in Table 4.3. Using this information, the architect
can study the area, power and performance penalty of the SER-mitigation
techniques under consideration, and make appropriate trade-offs. A signifi-
cant advantage of this technique is its adaptiveness. When the circuit-level
fault rate of one or more structures are reduced, the framework automatically
stresses other structures such that the overall SER approaches the maximum.
The architect can thus pick candidate structures for protection from soft errors,
that demonstrably have a significant impact on the overall SER.
4.7.1 Comparison with Other Possible Methodologies
In the absence of an AVF stressmark, it is impossible to know whether
the set of 33 workloads offers sufficient AVF coverage. Table 4.3 shows the
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worst SER observed on the set of workloads. The stressmark induces increased
SER of 37%, 29% and 33% over the highest SER-inducing programs for the
Baseline Configuration, Configuration RHC, and Configuration EDR, respec-
tively. Clearly, a safety margin that does not account for this lack of SER
coverage may result in under-design. Conversely, an aggressive safety margin
could result in over-design.
Table 4.3 also presents the worst-case SER estimated by picking the
highest SER on a per-structure basis, and adding them together, which is re-
ferred to as “Sum of highest per-structure SER”. This methodology results in
an error of 8%, 3%, and 17%, relative to the stressmark, for the Baseline Con-
figuration, Configuration RHC, and Configuration EDR, respectively. For the
selected workloads, the stressmark induces higher AVF. This is not necessarily
the case, as one could write programs that drive individual structures to max-
imum AVF. This methodology produces variable results, and is fundamentally
unsound. The worst-case SERs calculated by adding the raw circuit-level SER
for individual circuits would be 1 unit/bit for the Baseline, 0.59 units/bit for
Configuration RHC and 0.39 units/bit for configuration EDR. This is an over-
estimation, and will lead to an extremely pessimistic design. This, in turn,
will impact performance, power and design effort of the processor.
4.7.2 Utilizing the Stressmark Methodology
The knowledge of the observable worst-case SER allows an architect to
evaluate the robustness of the SER evaluation workload suite in use. In the
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Configuration Stressmark Best Individual Sum of Highest
Program SER per-structure SER
(units/bit) (units/bit) (units/bit)
Baseline 0.63 0.46 (447.dealII) 0.58
RHC 0.31 0.24 (459.gemsFDTD) 0.3
EDR 0.2 0.15 (susan) 0.17
Table 4.3: Comparison of worst-case SER estimation methodologies in the
Core using SPEC CPU2006 and MiBench
case of the workloads considered in this section, the worst-case SER induced
by an individual program in the workload suite of 33 programs is significantly
less than the stressmark. This suggests that, at least for the microarchitec-
ture under consideration, SPEC CPU2006 and MiBench may not be varied
enough. The workload suite is lacking in programs that occupy the upper end
of SER range. The stressmark reveals “SER bottlenecks” in the processor, and
can be used to identify programs that may target these structures to induce
high AVF. This, however, motivates the need for a rigourous methodology
for selecting workloads for that achieve sufficient AVF/SER coverage, and are
representative of user workloads, for SER evaluation.
Extending the Stressmark to Include Other Structures The code gen-
erator is currently designed to target the parts of the processor that contain
the most state, and hence the highest sources of SER. However, the method-
ology is general enough to be extended to other structures, with or without
modification. For example, fetch and decode queues are always maintained
at 100% AVF as the stressmark never incurs any branch mispredictions. FP
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instructions can be trivially incorporated into the same framework as integer
instructions. However, if all these large structures are protected with error
detection and recovery, the SER bottleneck will shift to other parts of the
microarchitecture. This will potentially require the design of a different code
generator, that stresses these smaller structures. A study similar to the one
presented herein will be required, that identifies microarchitecture-dependent
characteristics, and utilizes these to create a code generator. Restricting the
search space of the GA is important to allow it to converge in a reasonable
amount of time.
4.8 AVF Stressmark Generation for In-order Pipelines
The task of generating AVF stressmarks for in-order pipelines is gener-
ally simpler than that for out-of-order machines. As instructions in an in-order
machine execute in the same order as in the program binary, many large and
complex structures that contain state, such as the ROB and the load and
store queues are eliminated. For this work, we consider the instruction buffer,
store buffer, functional units, and architected register file, as these contain the
largest amount of state for an inorder machine. Table 4.4 represents an inorder
superscalar machine with an designed issue width of 2 instructions per cycle.
The instruction buffer (IB) holds decoded instructions until they are
ready to be issued. The issued instructions execute in the function units, and
are subsequently retired. The store buffer (SB) contains stores that have been
retired, but are waiting to be written out to the caches or memory. The Alpha
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Parameter Configuration
Issue Width 2, in-order
Integer ALU 2 ALUs, 1 cycle latency
Integer Multiplier 2, 7 cycle latency
Instruction Buffer 16 entries, 32 bits per entry
Store Buffer 8 entries, 128 bits per entry
Architected Register File 32 entries, 64 bits per entry
L1 Instruction and Data Cache 32kB, 4 way set associative, 1 cycle latency
L2 Cache 1MB, 8 way set associative, 9 cycle latency
TLB 512 entry, fully associative
Branch Predictor 4k gshare, 4k BTB
Table 4.4: In-order Configuration.
ISA defines 32 general-purpose integer registers, which are contained in the
Architected Register File (ARF). The in-order machine is modeled using Sim-
plescalar simulator [49], modified to capture the AVF of each of the structures
under consideration.
The same code generator framework used for generation of stressmarks
for out-of-order machines is used. However, only a subset of these knobs
have an impact on the AVF of the aforementioned structures in an in-order
machine. Additionally, the strategy of stalling on L2 misses will increase the
occupancy of the IB, but not the SB or FUs, as was the case in an out-of-order
machine. In an in-order machine, stalling on an L2 miss will result in very low
utilization of the SB and the FUs. It is possible to prune the search space by
eliminating such redundancies or obviously poor strategies. However, for the
data presented herein, the code generator for the out-of-order machine is run
as-is.
Figure 4.9 presents the results of the AVF stressmark generated for the
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in-order configuration outlined in Table 4.4, assuming an underlying circuit-
level fault rate of 1 unit/bit. The stressmark induces higher AVF in every
individual structure than any SPEC CPU2006 or MiBench workload. The
stressmark increases the AVF of the ARF, SB, IB, and FU to increase the
overall SER. Each register is un-ACE between a read and subsequent write.
As the GA uses arithmetic instructions to increase the AVF of the FUs, some
writes to the ARF are inevitable, resulting in an AVF of 0.77 in the ARF. In
this architecture, the number of bits in the function units are relatively signifi-
cant in comparison to other structures in the core, and is hence a larger trade-
off between RF AVF and FU AVF. The stressmark induces 30% higher SER
in the in-order core than the highest SPEC CPU2006 or MiBench workload
(gromacs). The methodology does not change significantly for multithreaded
in-order machines. An additional thread would be necessary to populate the
ARF of the other hardware context. This hardware thread can then stall,
allowing the stressmark presented herein to maximize the utilization of the
shared structures. Although multithreading two workloads may potentially
increase the AVF of the FUs, this will result in a reduction in the AVF of
the register file, as the register is un-ACE for the duration between the last
read, and write. Additionally, they also reduce the effective issue width for
the other thread. Therefore, there is only a need to maximize the AVF of the
register files, which can be easily done. Thus, creation of a multithreaded in-
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(b) SER observed while running SPEC CPU2006 and MiBench workloads compared to
the Stressmark




No of Loads 1
No of Stores 7
No of dependent 1
arithmetic
No of independent 22
arithmetic
No of instructions 1
dependent on L2 hit
Dependency Distance 7
Fraction of long- 0.0
latency instructions
Fraction of Reg-Reg 0.73
instructions
Table 4.5: Knob Settings for the In-order Stressmark
presented herein.
4.9 Discussion
The AVF stressmark methodology presented herein is limited by the
lack of low-level detail in an academic simulator. In the absence of low-level
microarchitectural and circuit detail, ACE analysis is done conservatively. As
low-level modeling information is added to the AVF estimation, the conser-
vatism in the estimation of AVF is significantly reduced.
Furthermore, structures such as control circuits, much of the datapath,
register alias tables, branch misprediction recovery checkpoints, decoders, etc.
have not been modeled in this work, owing to the relatively small amount of
state contained in them as compared to the structures considered in this work,
or the lack of low-level detail necessary to model these structures, or both. As
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noted earlier, it is impossible for all structures to contain state simulateneously,
making sum of intrisic fault rates a poor metric for estimating the worst-case
observable SER. The stressmark methodology provides an effective way of
determining the worst-case observable SER.
SER estimation using AVF modeling also depends on accurate estima-
tion of intrinsic fault rates. As AVF is multiplied by the intrinsic fault rates
to estimate soft error rates, errors in estimating intrisic fault rates will be am-
plified. It is therefore necessary to compute the intrinsic fault rate accurately.
4.10 Conclusions
In this section, the lack of a methodology for evaluating the highest
observable SER is highlighted. It is demonstrated that methodologies that
ignore the interactions between structures within a processor may incur sig-
nificant errors while estimating the highest SER under program influence.
Therefore an automated and flexible methodology, derived from a comprehen-
sive study of interactions between structures in an OoO processor is proposed,
that generates an stressmark that approaches the maximum SER observable
while running a program. It is demonstrated that the methodology can en-
able architects to make quantifiable decisions regarding the effect of various
SER mitigation mechanisms on overall highest SER. This knowledge enables
the architect to make better informed trade-offs between performance, power,
area and SER reliability. It is shown that the stressmark achieves 1.4×, 2.5×,
and 1.5× higher SER in core, DL1+DTLB and L2 respectively, as compared
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to the highest SER induced by SPEC CPU2006 and MiBench programs for a
4-wide out-of-order architecture similar to the Alpha 21264.
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Chapter 5
Mechanistic Modeling for Architectural
Vulnerability Factor
In this chapter, a first-order mechanistic model for Architectural Vul-
nerability Factor (AVF) is presented. Derived from the first principles of super-
scalar processor execution, the mechanistic model is designed to provide insight
into the precise interaction between the microarchitecture and the workload
that together influence AVF. Using a set of inexpensive profiles, the model es-
timates the AVF of the ROB, IQ, LQ, SQ and FU with a Mean Absolute Error
of less than 7%. The model is used to perform design space exploration and
parametric sweeps, and to characterize workloads for their impact on AVF.
Figure 1.2 provides an overview of the modeling methodology. The workloads
are profiled once, and the statistics thus collected may be used to estimate the
performance and AVF of multiple microarchitectures nearly instantaneously.
Owing to its construction, the model presented herein can provide in-
sight into the fundamental factors influencing the AVF of a structure, beyond
what is obtained using detailed simulation, or “black-box” models such as sta-
tistical or machine-learning based models [9–11]. Detailed, microarchitectural
simulations typically present the aggregate masking effect of the ACE bits
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due the workload, and the impact of microarchitectural events triggered by a
workload on the occupancy of these ACE bits in a structure. It is difficult to
infer the exact factors affecting AVF from aggregate metrics [14]. Statistical or
machine-learning based modeling also do not easily quantify the fundamental
interactions between the workload and microarchitecture, making it difficult
to derive insight into the factors affecting AVF. The methodology presented
herein models the workloads influence on microarchitectural events, and on
the number of ACE bits induced in the structure, providing greater insight
into the factors affecting AVF of a design.
Eyerman et al. [33] refer to analytical modeling methodologies that
capture the fundamental mechanisms of operation of the processor as mech-
anistic models, to contrast them with other black-box modeling alternatives.
The same terminology will be used in this dissertation.
The following are the unique contributions derived from the work pre-
sented herein:
• A novel first-order analytical model for AVF, designed from first princi-
ples to capture the impact of microarchitectural events on the AVF of
major out-of-order processor structures is presented. The key novelty
of this modeling effort over prior mechanistic models for performance
[32, 33] is that it captures the interaction between different events occur-
ring in a processor, and estimates the average occupancy of correct-path
state, with low error. This enables the architect to derive unique insight
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into the factors affecting the AVF of a structure, not available using
aggregate metrics or black-box models.
• As the model requires inexpensive profiling, it can be used to perform
design space exploration studies nearly instantaneously. The model is
used to study the effect of scaling the ROB, issue width and memory
latency on AVF, which provides valuable insight into the effect of mi-
croarchitecture and workload interactions on AVF.
• The model is used for workload characterization for AVF. It quantita-
tively explains why some high-IPC workloads induce high AVF in CPU
structures whereas others do not, and why not all workloads with a large
number of last-level data cache misses induce high AVF. The methodol-
ogy can be used to identify high AVF workloads.
5.1 Modeling AVF using Interval Analysis
The central idea behind this modeling methodology is to model the
occupancy of correct-path state in the core. Recall from Section 2.5 that
the mispredicted, or wrong-path state in the processor will be un-ACE. By
derating the occupancy of correct-path state in a structure by the proportion
of ACE bits induced in it by the workload, the AVF of the structure can be
estimated.
The modeling methodology is inspired by Interval Analysis, which was
presented in Section 2.8. Similar to Interval Analysis for performance, the oc-
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cupancy of correct-path state in the core is modeled as an ideal, uninterrupted
occupancy, punctuated by miss events that alter this occupancy depending on
their behavior. By computing the average occupancy, weighted by the number
of cycles spent in each interval, the overall average occupancy of correct-path
state can be estimated. A key departure from the Interval Analysis method-
ology for performance is its assumption that miss events are independent of
one another, in the first order [32, 33]. This assumption does not hold true
for occupancy. Therefore, modeling of correct-path occupancy necessitates
the modeling of interactions between various miss events, and their collective
influence on occupancy.
The following discussion describes the methodology for estimating the
occupancy of correct-path state, of the ROB, LQ, SQ, IQ, and FU, which
contain the largest amount of corruptible state in the core. The exclusion
of wrong-path instructions from the occupancy estimations enables the easily
computation AVF by derating this occupancy by the fraction of bits introduced
into a structure that were ACE. Un-ACE instructions are identified through
profiling and this information is used to determine the number of ACE bits
injected in to each structure while running the workload. The separation of
the program’s influence on the number of ACE bits induced in a structure,
and the residency of these ACE bits in the structure enables the architect
to gain deeper insight into the interaction of events, and their contribution
to overall AVF. As with any analytical modeling methodology, the design
objective in this modeling methodology is to balance accuracy with simplicity
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of formulation, the ability to provide quantitative insight, and ease of collecting
necessary program characteristics.
The following section describes the estimation the occupancy of eventu-
ally committed state in the ROB using Interval Analysis. The ROB occupancy
governs the occupancy of LQ, SQ, and FU, and can be used to estimate their
occupancy/utilization. As the IQ can issue instructions out-of-order, its oc-
cupancy is estimated independently in Section 5.3. AVF can be estimated by
derating the occupancy of the structures with the average fraction of ACE bits
in these structures.
5.2 Modeling the AVF of the ROB
The occupancy of the ROB is modeled using interval analysis as having
a steady-state, or ideal value in the absence of miss events. Each miss event
would alter occupancy of correct-path instructions, depending on its behavior.
Averaging the occupancy during the steady-state execution and miss events,
weighted by the cycles spent in each interval gives the overall average occu-
pancy. The ramp-up and ramp-down curves for occupancy are linearized, with
slopes equal to the steady-state dispatch rate, in the interest of simplicity. The
effect of each miss event on occupancy are studied independently of one an-
other, in Sections 5.2.1 through 5.2.3. Subsequently, an analysis of the impact
of interaction between miss events is presented in Section 5.2.5.
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5.2.1 Modeling steady-state occupancy
As seen in Section 2.8, given an instruction window of size W , the total
number of cycles taken to execute all instructions in the instruction window
is a function of the latency of executing the critical path. The average critical
path length K(W ) for a given program is modeled as K(W ) = 1
α
W 1/β [32, 34]
where α and β are constants that are determined by fitting the relationship
between K(W ) and W to a power curve. This analysis is performed assuming
that all instructions have unit latency. Therefore, given an average instruction
latency l, the critical path would require l·K(W ) cycles. Using Little’s law, the
ideal IPC (I(W )) that can be extracted from the program given an instruction
window of size W is presented in Equation 5.1 [32, 34]. For a processor with
a designed dispatch width D, setting I(W ) = D, and rearranging the terms
in Equation 5.1 gives us the steady-state ROB occupancy, OROBideal , or W (D)















If the ideal IPC of the program is less than the designed dispatch width,
the program requires a much larger instruction window to extract the necessary
ILP. In this case, the occupancy of the ROB will saturate to 100%. As noted























Table 5.1: Values of α and β for SPEC CPU2006 workloads.
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typical workload will not frequently stall due to a full IQ. Therefore, only the
typical case is considered for modeling.
Table 5.1 lists the values of α and β for workloads in the SPEC CPU2006
suite. Note that β > 1 for any real workload. Values of β < 1 are meaningless,
as they either imply that the critical path in the instruction window K(W ) is
potentially longer than the instruction window size W (0 < β < 1), or that the
critical path length reduces as the instruction window size increases (β < 0).
In the case of SPEC CPU2006, β ranges between 1.24 (libquantum) and 2.40
(milc). Lower values of β indicate less ILP, whereas higher values indicate
more ILP. Consequently, β
β−1 in Equation 5.2 asymptotically approaches∞ as
β → 1, and approaches 1 for large values of β. This implies that workloads
with low ILP need a larger instruction window to be able to issue the same
number of instructions per cycle as compared to a workload with high ILP.
Figure 5.1 presents the relationship between K(W) and W for a range of
instruction window sizes up to 512 entries. The power curve fit for determining
α and β is depicted by the solid black curve, with the corresponding equation
for the power curve. For workloads such as bzip2 (Figure 5.1(a)), the fit is
nearly exact. For other workloads such as astar (Figure 5.1(b)), the fit diverges
somewhat at the higher end of the curve. These two cases are typical of most
workloads. For yet other workloads such as hmmer (Figure 5.1(c)), the I-W
curve is slightly irregular, leading to a relatively sub-optimal fit. Although








































(c) I-W curve for hmmer
Figure 5.1: I-W characteristics for sample SPEC CPU2006 workloads.
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(a) Occupancy of the ROB in the
shadow of an L2 miss






























































(b) Occupancy of the ROB during a branch
misprediction
Figure 5.2: Modeling the Occupancy of the ROB Using Interval Analysis.
changing b havior in different intervals, leading to divergence with the fitted
power curv at various points along it. This may be problematic for workloads
that have few miss events, making the accuracy of the I-W curve fit a critical
factor. This will be discussed in detail in Section 5.7.
It is recommended that a value of W that is much larger than the range
of instruction window sizes of interest be selected for doing curve fitting. This
avoids any error from the divergence at the extremes.
5.2.2 Modeling Occupancy in the Shadow of Long-Latency Data
Cache Misses
As shown in Figure 5.2(a), a non-overlapped data L2 miss (or a TLB
miss for a hardware-managed TLB) reaches the head of the ROB, blocking
the retirement of subsequent instructions. The processor continues to dis-
patch instructions until the ROB fills up completely. Thus, the occupancy in
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Figure 5.3: Modeling the Occupancy During an I-cache Miss.
the shadow of a non-overlapped L2 miss is OROBDL2Miss = W . When the data
eventually returns from main memory, the L2 miss completes, and the pro-
cessor is now able to retire instructions. At this point, the assumption about
interval analysis requires that the occupancy of the ROB returns to steady-
state. However, this need not be the case: the occupancy of the ROB can
remain at nearly 100% if the processor is capable of dispatching and retiring
instructions at the same rate. In Section 5.2.5, a procedure for accounting for
this interaction is explained.
5.2.3 Modeling Occupancy During Front-End Misses
Modeling Occupancy During an L1 I-cache Miss: The occupancy of
the ROB during an L1 I-cache miss depends on the hit latency of the L2 cache,
as shown in Figure 5.3, and therefore requires special modeling. When an L1
I-cache miss occurs, the processor is initially able to dispatch instructions
until the front-end pipeline drains. Subsequently, the occupancy of the ROB
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decreases by a rate determined by the ideal IPC (see Equation 5.1), as depicted
by the solid line. Once the I-cache miss resolves and the front-end pipeline is
refilled, occupancy of the ROB starts increasing at the rate of the ideal IPC
(Equation 5.1). Linearizing ramp-up and ramp-down, the shaded areas under
the ramp-up and ramp-down are equal, allowing the model to approximate
occupancy as depicted by the dotted line. As depicted in Figure 5.3, the
occupancy of state during an I-cache miss reduces in proportion to the designed
dispatch or retirement rate D (assuming that they are equal), and the latency
of the I-cache miss. Thus, OROBIL1Miss = O
ROB
ideal − latL2 ·D, where latL2 cycles is
the hit latency of the L2 cache. This allows us to model changes in occupancy
as steps, greatly simplifying computation, and is used to model other miss
events as well.
The occupancy during other front-end misses such as L1 I-cache misses,
L2 instruction misses, and I-TLB misses can be modeled on similar lines. As
the latencies of L2 instruction misses and I-TLB misses are relatively large,
the occupancy of the ROB goes down to zero.
Modeling Occupancy During a Branch Misprediction: Figure 5.2(b)
illustrates the effect of a branch misprediction on the occupancy of the ROB.
The solid line depicts the occupancy of correct-path instructions in the ROB.
All instructions fetched after the mispredicted branch are eventually discarded,
and hence un-ACE. As correct-path instructions are retired, and instructions
from the mispredicted path continue to be fetched, the occupancy of ACE
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state decreases. The overall occupancy, as indicated using the dotted line
remains at the steady-state value, until the branch misprediction is detected
and the pipeline is flushed. Karkhanis and Smith [32] show that assuming
an oldest-first issue policy, the mispredicted branch is among the last correct-
path instructions to be executed in the instruction window. Simultaneously,
retirement of instructions drains the ROB of correct-path state, resulting in
low ACE occupancy by the time the misprediction is detected, and the pipeline
is flushed. Thus, OROBbrMp ≈ 0. After the front-end pipeline refills and dispatch
resumes, the occupancy of the ROB eventually returns to the steady-state
value.
5.2.4 Computing Occupancy of Correct-Path Instructions in the
ROB
The interval analysis model for performance enables the estimation of
the number of cycles spent during each execution interval. The model pre-
sented herein enables the estimation of the occupancy of correct-path instruc-
tions the ROB during these intervals. Thus, average occupancy of the ROB,




× (OROBideal · Cideal +OROBDL2Miss · CDL2Miss +OROBIL1Miss · CIL1Miss
+OROBbrMp · CbrMp +OROBITLBMiss · CITLBMiss +OROBDTLBMiss · CDTLBMiss)
(5.3)
In essence, Equation 5.3 is the average occupancy, weighted by the
number of cycles spent in each interval.
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5.2.5 Modeling the Effect of Interactions Between Miss Events
The following discussion explores the cases in which multiple miss-
events may interact with each other, and whether they have a significant
impact on the accuracy of the model.
Dependent Branch Mispredictions in the Shadow of a Long-Latency
Data Miss: Consider the case in which a branch is dependent on a long-
latency data L2/TLB miss, and occurs within the same instruction window.
If such a branch is mispredicted, all instructions in the ROB fetched after the
branch instruction are un-ACE. As the branch will not resolve until the cache
miss completes, the occupancy of correct-path state in the shadow of this L2
miss is not 100%, as shown in Figure 5.4(a). Programs such as perlbench,
gcc, mcf and astar have a significant number of such interactions. Branch
mispredictions that are independent of long-latency data cache misses will
resolve quickly enough such that their interaction has little effect on occupancy,
and are hence ignored. This assumption is tested in Section 5.7.2.
This interaction between long-latency data misses and dependent branch
mispredictions is captured by computing the number of instances in which a
non-overlapped data L2 or TLB miss has a dependent mispredicted branch
in its instruction window (Ndep(W )), and the average number of instructions
between the earliest dependent mispredicted branch and the non-overlapped
miss at the head of the ROB (lenDL2,Br(W ), lenDTLB,Br(W )). Note that the
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(b) Quantifying the number of data L2/TLB misses followed by long intervals,
before the occurence of a front-end miss.
Figure 5.4: Modeling the Effects of Interactions Between Miss Events on Oc-
cupancy.
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mispredicted branch only needs to be dependent on any data L2 or TLB
cache miss in the instruction window. This computation can be added to
the existing profiler for non-overlapped data cache misses with little over-
head. It does, however, require that information on mispredicted branches
from the branch profiler be made available to the non-overlapped data cache
miss profiler. Thus, Ndep(W ) data L2 misses have only lenDL2,Br(W ) correct-
path instructions in their shadow, whereas the remaining data L2 misses have
W correct-path instructions in their shadow. Assuming NDL2Miss(W ) non-
overlapped misses, the term OROBDL2Miss · CDL2Miss in Equation 5.3 is expressed
as latDL2Miss · (lenDL2,Br(W ) ·Ndep(W ) +W · (NDL2Miss(W )−Ndep(W ))).
Interaction of Data cache and Instruction Cache Misses: The model
presented herein is impacted by two types of interactions between data-cache
and instruction cache miss events. The first case occurs when an L2 instruction
cache or ITLB miss occurs in the shadow of a non-overlapped DL2 or DTLB
miss, resulting in less than 100% occupancy of the ROB. This case is very rare;
only perlbench is significantly impacted by this, due to its higher proportion
of ITLB misses. A procedure similar to the aforementioned case of dependent
branch instructions is followed to estimate the impact of these interactions. L1
I-cache misses in the shadow of a non-overlapped L2/DTLB miss will resolve
quickly, and hence their interaction has negligible effect on average occupancy.
A second case is when the duration between a long-latency data cache
miss and front-end miss is too long. As described in Section 5.2.2, a simplifying
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assumption that the occupancy of the ROB returns to steady state relatively
quickly after a long-latency data cache miss retires, as a result of subsequent
front-end misses causing the ROB to drain, may not be entirely accurate.
Therefore, the fraction of non-overlapped DL2 and DTLB misses that are
separated from a front-end miss by at least 2W instructions are measured.
This interval length is chosen to be large enough to eliminate misses that
occur in the shadow of the L2 and DTLB miss. Furthermore, a significant
number of misses occur within 2W of the non-overlapped L2/TLB miss, which
have negligible impact on accuracy. Thus, only the length of long intervals is
captured, and the impact of very short intervals on the average is filtered out.
Figure 5.4(b) outlines the average number of non-overlapped misses that are
followed by intervals of greater length than 2W instructions, for the cache and
branch predictor configuration outlined for the wide-issue machine, in Table
5.2. As seen in Figure 5.4(b), with the exception of hmmer, gobmk, sjeng, and
astar, this situation occurs infrequently. The average length of such sequences
for these workloads range between 300 and 450 instructions. Thus, the fraction
of non-overlapped L2 misses in Figure 5.4(b) will experience a subsequent
region of ideal execution in which occupancy is W , which is included in the
calculations for the model.
A similar experiment performed to capture long intervals between two
consecutive data L2/TLB misses, results in the conclusion that they are much
fewer in number, and affect only workloads dominated by these misses. There-
fore, they have negligible impact on average occupancy of these workloads due
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to the dominance of L2/TLB misses on overall occupancy.
Clustered Front-End Misses: With the exception of the L1 I-cache miss,
the ROB is completely drained after a front-end miss event. As these misses
are independent of each other, their impact on occupancy is separable, in the
first-order. Due to the relatively low latency of an L1 I-cache miss that hits in
the L2, the ROB may not be completely drained before the miss resolves. Thus,
two I-cache misses relatively close to each other may drive occupancy lower
than if they occurred separately. Similarly, an I-cache miss quickly following a
branch misprediction may experience lower occupancy. However, the latency
of each I-cache miss is relatively short, and therefore, an large number of such
events are necessary to produce a meaningful impact on overall occupancy.
For the workloads under consideration, the number of I-cache misses are not
significant enough in number to warrant modeling of their interactions. The
relative infrequency of such events, and the relatively low impact on average
occupancy implies that their impact is negligible. This assumption will be
evaluated in Section 5.7.2.
5.3 Modeling of the AVF of the IQ
The occupancy of the Issue Queue requires separate modeling due to the
fact that instructions can issue out-of-order. The model assumes an oldest-first
issue policy. Occupancy of correct-path instructions during front-end misses
is modeled in exactly the same way as the ROB. Steady-state occupancy, and
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occupancy in the shadow of a long-latency data cache or TLB miss needs to
be modeled differently, as outlined below.
Steady-state IQ occupancy: Let A(W ) be the average number of instruc-
tions in a chain of dependent instructions in the instruction window. A(W ) is
obtained as a by-product of the critical-path profiling necessary to determine
K(W ). The average latency of each instruction in the IQ is l · A(W ). Using
Little’s law, OIQideal = l · A(W ) ·min(D, I(W )) [58].
Occupancy in the Shadow of a Long-Latency Data Miss: When issue
of instructions ceases in the shadow of an L2/TLB miss, the IQ contains only
the instructions dependent on such misses. The average number of instructions
dependent on the L2 and DTLB misses in the instruction window is measured,
to determine the average occupancy during such miss events. This profiling
can be added to the existing profiler for determining non-overlapped data-
cache misses, and incurs no overhead. This profiling also captures the effect
of interactions between data L2/TLB misses and front-end misses, similar to
the procedure outlined in Section 5.2.5.
5.4 Modeling the AVF of LQ, SQ, and FU
The occupancy of the Load Queue, Store Queue and Function Units can
be derived from the occupancy of the ROB, and the instruction mix (I-mix).
Additionally, by classifying un-ACE instructions according to the I-mix, the
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occupancy of each of these units is derated to estimate AVF. FU utilization can
be estimated using Little’s Law, as the latency of each arithmetic instruction
and the issue rate are known.
Loads and stores enter the LQ and SQ after they are issued, and remain
there until they are retired. As seen in Section 5.3, the average dispatch-to-
issue latency for an instruction is l · A(W ) cycles. Thus, the LQ and SQ
occupancy can be estimated as the fraction of loads and stores in the ROB,
adjusted for the average dispatch-to-issue latency of the loads/stores in the
instruction stream. Thus, the occupancy-cycle product in the ideal case for
SQ is expressed as (Nstores/Ntotal) · OROBideal · Cideal − l · A(W ) · Nstores, where
Nstores and Ntotal are the number of stores, and total number of instructions
respectively. All other occupancy-cycle products from Equation 5.3 are mul-
tiplied by the fraction of stores to estimate OSQtotal. The occupancy estimation
is further improved by also including the number of loads and stores in the
shadow of a non-overlapped data L2/TLB in the calculations.
5.5 Assumptions of the Model
The model assumes that for a processor with designed issue or dispatch
width D, in the absence of any long-latency miss events, the processor is able
to dispatch instructions at peak dispatch width, and is not constrained for
resources (functional units, load and store queue entries, MSHRs, etc) while
running typical workloads. An implicit assumption of the model is that the
processor must not be underprovisioned. In prior work, Eyerman et al. [33]
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assume a balanced processor, and define it as one in which “for a given dispatch
width D, the ROB (window size) and other resources such as the issue buffer(s),
load/store buffers, rename registers, MSHRs, functional units, write buffers,
etc., are of sufficient size to achieve sustained processor performance of D
instructions per cycle in the absence of miss events. Furthermore, for a given
balanced design, reducing the size of any one of the resources will reduce
sustained performance below D instructions per cycle”. In this dissertation,
rather than emphasizing the assumption of a balanced design, a configuration
that is not underprovisioned is assumed.
It is assumed in this dissertation that the sizes of the load and store
queues are large enough so as to extract all the available MLP from the in-
structions in the instruction window. If the size of the load and store queue
constrains the extraction of MLP from the instruction window, the load and
store queue sizes need to be considered while estimating the number of non-
overlapped data cache misses.
All scaling studies and design space evaluation studies presented herein
assume that the processor is not underprovisioned.
5.6 Evaluation
SimpleScalar [49] is used to evaluate the accuracy of the mechanistic
model presented herein. ACE analysis is implemented on a modified version of
SimpleScalar. Bit-wise ACE analysis is performed, as opposed to an occupancy
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Parameter Wide Issue Machine Narrow Issue Machine
ROB 128 entries, 76 bits per entry 64 entries, 76 bits per entry
Issue Queue 64 entries, 32 bits per entry 32 entries, 32 bits per entry
LQ 64 entries, 80 bits per entry 32 entries, 80 bits per entry
SQ 64 entries, 144 bits per entry 32 entries, 144 bits per entry
Branch Predictor Combined, 4K bimodal, Combined, 4K bimodal,
4K gshare, 4K choice, 4K BTB 4K gshare, 4K choice, 4K BTB
Front-end pipeline depth 7 5
Fetch/dispatch/ 4/4/4/4/4 per cycle 2/2/2/2 per cycle
issue/execute/commit
L1 I-cache 32kB, 4-way set associative 32kB, 4-way set associative
L1 D cache 32kB, 4-way set associative 32kB, 4-way set associative
L2 cache 1MB, 8-way set associative 1MB, 8-way set associative
DL1/L2 latency 2/9 cycles 2/9 cycles
DTLB and ITLB 512 entry, fully associative 512 entry, fully associative
Memory Latency 300 cycles 300 cycles
TLB Miss Latency 75 cycles 75 cycles
Table 5.2: Processor Configurations
heuristic. Simplescalar models a unified instruction window, that combines the
ROB and the IQ into a single unit. Therefore, Simplescalar is modified to have
a separate IQ. Further, the LQ and SQ are modeled separately, as opposed to
the unified Load-Store Queue (LSQ) in SimpleScalar.
The accuracy of the first-order mechanistic model is evaluated using
20 SPEC CPU2006 workloads (compiler issues prevented the remaining work-
loads for Alpha from being successfully compiled) using gcc v4.1 compiled with
-O2 flag. The profilers and the detailed simulator on single simulation points
of length 100 million instructions, identified using the SimPoint methodol-
ogy [53]. The two configurations evaluated in this discussion are presented in
Table 5.2. Wide-issue machine represents an 4-wide issue out-of-order super-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(f) Soft Error Rate
Figure 5.5: Modeling the AVF of the Wide-Issue Machine.
5.7 Results
The AVF of the ROB, IQ, LQ, SQ, and FU is presented in Figure 5.5.
The overall SER for these structures is also computed, assuming an arbitrary
circuit-level fault rate of 0.01 units/bit, due to the unavailability of real data.
However, it allows us to compute the relative error in the SER estimated by
the model.
112
Figure 5.5(a) presents a comparison between the modeled and simulated
AVF of the ROB. The mean absolute error in estimating AVF is 0.03, with
a maximum error of 0.08 for hmmer. As AVF is normalized to the number
of bits in the structure (see Equation 2.2), it has a tendency to amplify small
errors in small structures. Therefore, for a sense of proportion, the absolute
error in estimating SER in terms of the circuit-level fault-rate of each entry
in the corresponding structure is expressed. Thus, the mean absolute error in
the ROB is equivalent to the fault-rate of 3.8 entries, and the worst-case error
is 10.2 entries. In the interest of brevity, in the following discussion, when the
absolute SER error is expressed as n entries, it stands to mean “equivalent to
the circuit-level fault-rate of n entries in the corresponding structure”.
The average absolute IQ AVF error is 0.07 (4.5 IQ entries), with a max-
imum error of 0.155 for bwaves, (9.9 entries) in the IQ. The average absolute
LQ and SQ errors are 0.045, and 0.02, respectively, which translates to an er-
ror of 2.8 entries, and 1.3 entries, respectively. The maximum errors are 0.09
(zeusmp) and 0.06 (omnetpp), which translates to the fault-rate of 5.7 entries,
and 3.84 entries in the LQ, and SQ, respectively. The mean absolute error for
the FUs is 0.01, with a maximum error of 0.05 for zeusmp.
Figure 5.5(f) presents the combined SER for the ROB, IQ, LQ, SQ
and FU. Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) is typically used to compute the





i=0(mi − ai)2, where mi, ai and




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(f) Soft Error Rate
Figure 5.6: Modeling the AVF of the Narrow-Issue Machine
114
respectively. RMSE places higher weights on larger deviations, due to the
squaring of errors. Normalized RMSE (NRMSE) is computed by dividing the
RMSE by the arithmetic mean of the actual values. The NRMSE for the
mechanistic model on the wide-issue machine is 9.0%.
Figure 5.6 presents the AVF and SER for the narrow-issue machine
outlined in Table 5.2. The mean absolute error in AVF for the ROB is 0.06
(3.84 entries) with a maximum absolute error of 0.13 (8.3 entries) for hmmer.
The mean absolute error in estimating the AVF of the IQ is 0.067 (2.14 entries)
with a max error of 0.16 (5.12 entries) for leslie3d. The mean absolute error
for the LQ is 0.047 (1.5 entries) with a maximum error of 0.1 (3.2 entries) for
gemsFDTD. The average absolute error for the SQ is 0.02 (0.64 entries) with
a maximum error of 0.07 (2.24 entries) for milc. The average FU AVF error
is 0.02, with a maximum of 0.13 for gromacs. The SER using the model and
simulation is presented in Figure 5.6(f). The NRMSE for the narrow-issue
configuration is 10.3% as compared to detailed ACE analysis.
For completeness, the model is also used to estimate the AVF while
running the stressmark for the baseline configuration presented in Section
4 on the wide-issue machine. The model estimates the AVF of the ROB
with an absolute error of 0.04. Thus, the model estimates AVF for the wide-
issue machine with reasonable accuracy. However, the error in estimating the
LQ AVF is significantly high. This is because of the atypical nature of the
stressmark: address of all loads are dependent on addresses of other last-level
cache misses (pointer chasing). The model assumes that loads will issue as
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soon as their dependences resolve, and that the dependence is equal to the
average steady-state dependence chain latency l · A(W ) (see Section 5.4). In
the case of the stressmark, all loads are dependent on other last-level cache
misses, making their dependence chain latency significantly larger than the
average case. This factor can be modeled with additional profiling to detect
pointer chasing. However, this is an atypical behavior. It is recommended that
the profiling detect cases in which such pointer-chasing occurs, and model it
if it occurs frequently.
5.7.1 Potential Sources of Error
The proportion of ACE bits injected in a structure by the program is
multiplied with the average occupancy to compute AVF, under the assumption
that the proportion of ACE bits induced by the workload remains roughly con-
stant during each interval. This is a reasonable assumption over the simulation
points used. Over larger execution lengths, a conservative approach would be
to estimate AVF over smaller execution lengths, and combine the results to
determine overall AVF. This does not significantly increase the profiling time
or AVF estimation time, but may require additional storage.
For workloads such as hmmer that incur very few miss events, and are
such that the relationship between W and K(W ) does not exactly fit a power
curve, this approximation may induce errors in modeling the ROB occupancy
(See Section 5.2.1). Despite this, the absolute error for hmmer is not very






















































































Figure 5.7: Impact of Ignoring the Interaction between Miss Events.
The out-of-order issue of instructions from the IQ causes errors in the
estimation of AVF. For example, NOP instructions leave the IQ almost imme-
diately, but are included in the computation of A(W ), and the average number
of ACE bits induced by the instruction stream. Capturing these effects would
require the combination of profiling and ACE analysis. This approach is specif-
ically avoided so that the model can provide insight into the architectural and
microarchitectural contributors to AVF, and avoid re-running of profiling and
ACE-analysis on microarchitectural changes such as to the fields in each IQ
entry, or using a different cache hierarchy.
5.7.2 Impact of Interaction between Miss Events
As noted in earlier discussions, the interaction between data cache and
TLB misses with front end events only affects the accuracy in estimating AVF
of a subset of workloads. Figure 5.7 illustrates the AVF of the ROB for the
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wide-issue machine, computed by assuming that each miss event is independent
of all the others. When compared with the ROB AVF error presented in
Figure 5.5(a), it is observed that the impact of such interactions is negligible
for a majority of workloads. However, workloads perlbench, gcc, mcf and
astar have increased error. This is especially true of perlbench and mcf, in
which a significant fraction of data L2 and TLB misses also have dependent
mispredicted branches, or instruction TLB misses, in their shadow. Workloads
such as hmmer also see an increase in error when the long intervals between a
data L2 or DTLB miss and front-end miss is not handled. The mean absolute
error in this case is 0.075 (as opposed to 0.03 when interactions are considered),
with the maximum error of 0.3 for mcf (as opposed to 0.08 when interactions
are considered). This graph demonstrates that ignoring these interactions will
induce significant error in the estimation of such workloads.
It is argued in Section 5.2.5 that consecutive, or clustered I-cache misses
have an insignificant impact on the estimation of correct path state due to their
infrequency and low latency. Table 5.3 presents the contribution of all I-cache
misses that hit in the L2 cache towards overall CPI. In no case do I-cache
misses have an influence of more than 6.41% on overall performance, and for
most workloads, it is less than 0.5%. Recall from Equation 5.3 that the occu-
pancy during each event is weighted by its contribution to the total number of
execution cycles to determine overall occupancy. A significant fraction of these
I-cache misses will not be clustered, resulting in a low inaccuracy if clustering
is ignored. For workloads that have a significant number of I-cache misses,
118
Workload Total Performance Total Performance Penalty due to
Penalty due to Independent Mispredictions





















Table 5.3: Contribution of I-cache misses, and branch mispredictions in the
shadow of long latency data cache misses, to overall CPI for the wide-issue
machine
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it may be necessary to model such clustering. The need for this will be indi-
cated by the number of cycles lost as a result of I-cache misses. In this case,
the I-cache miss immediately following an earlier I-cache miss will experience
lower occupancy which can be computed in a manner similar to an individual
I-cache miss.
Table 5.3 also outlines the contribution of branch mispredictions that
are in the shadow of the data L2/TLB miss, and independent of long latency
data misses to overall modeled CPI. The interval analysis model for CPI does
not account for such interactions, as the error in ignoring them is negligible
[32, 33]. As argued in Section 5.2.5, it is reasonable to assume that these
independent branch mispredictions in the shadow of long-latency cache misses
resolve quickly enough such that their overall impact on the average occupancy
is negligible, and hence can be ignored. In other words, for the workloads under
study, it is reasonable to model these branch mispredictions as if occurring
outside the shadow of the blocking long-latency data L2/TLB miss.
5.8 Applications of the Model
The analytical model can be used to study performance vs. AVF trade-
offs of SER mitigation techniques, the impact of sizing of structures on AVF
and performance, compiler optimizations on AVF, different cache sizes and
latencies, different branch predictors, etc. In this section, a small subset of
these design choices are explored. Specifically, the impact of scaling the ROB,
memory latency, and issue width are analyzed.
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5.8.1 The Impact of Scaling Microarchitectural Parameters
5.8.1.1 Impact of Scaling the ROB on AVF and performance
Sizing studies for AVF and performance are interesting because they
allow the architect to determine the trade-off between altering the size of a
structure on performance and AVF. For example, it may be reasonable to
reduce the ROB size by a small amount provided that it has negligible impact
on performance, but significantly reduces SER. Using the model, an architect
can instantaneously determine the impact of scaling a structure on AVF and
CPI. This section studies the impact of sizing the ROB on AVF and CPI on
the wide-issue machine presented in Table 5.2, assuming a circuit-level fault
rate of 0.01 units/bit. It is assumed that the IQ, LQ, SQ, FU, and other
structures are scaled to maintain the same proportion with the ROB as for
the wide-issue machine, so that the processor remains balanced.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the impact of scaling the size of the ROB from 64
to 160 entries, on the wide-issue machine. The trend in SER due to increase
in ROB size has two general mechanisms. Workloads for which the ROB is
not large enough to be able to sustain an ideal IPC of four will see an increase
in the contribution from ideal execution until this is satisfied. Workloads with
MLP will be able to exploit it, resulting in fewer stalls due to data L2/TLB
misses. However, for larger ROB sizes, the occupancy of instructions in the
shadow of these data L2/TLB misses increases as well, resulting in an overall



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































exceptions to, these mechanisms.
Workloads such as gobmk do not see significant change in their CPI or
SER due to a large enough ROB, and little available MLP. On the other hand,
workloads such as namd have a long critical dependency path, which results in
high values for β/(β − 1) and l/α (Section 5.2). Consequently, from Equation
5.2, namd induces high SER for all ROB sizes despite its low CPI.
For workloads such as libquantum, the increase in ROB size provides
increased MLP, resulting in lower CPI, but also a greater SER in the shadow of
the L2/DTLB miss. Libquantum is able to exploit more MLP than gemsFDTD
resulting in a greater rate of reduction of CPI, and a lesser rate of increase of
SER. Bwaves and zeus experience an increase in SER due to both mechanisms.
Perlbench and mcf represent two important exceptions to this general
trend. Despite both workloads having a significant number of data L2/TLB
misses, mcf experiences a significant number of branch mispredictions de-
pendent on data L2 misses, and perlbench experiences I-TLB misses, in the
shadow of data L2/TLB misses. Consequently, scaling of the ROB size has
little impact on SER, as the occupancy of state per cycle does not change sig-
nificantly. Mcf experiences reduction in CPI due to MLP, but the occupancy
of ACE state during such misses is still limited by the dependent mispredicted
branches.
The scaling study allows the architect to make the appropriate trade-
offs between performance and SER, and understand the factors affecting the
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scaling of workloads. For example, the 128-entry ROB provides a speedup
of 1.098 (harmonic mean) and increases the average SER by 18% over the
96-entry ROB.
5.8.1.2 Sensititivity of AVF to Memory Latency
The impact on AVF of changing memory latency, to provide insight into
the influence of memory bandwidth contention in CMPs, or Dynamic Voltage
and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) is an interesting study, because it provides
insight into the effect of these commonplace techniques on AVF. Figure 5.9
presents the overall SER for a memory latency of 150 cycles, and 300 cycles,
obtained using the model, and from detailed simulation, assuming a constant
circuit-level fault rate1 of 0.01 units/bit. The memory latency used by the
model and simulation is enclosed in parentheses. From the formula for AVF
(see Equation 2.2), it can intuitively be seen that reduction in memory latency
reduces the total number of cycles of ACE bit residency, and the total number
of execution cycles. Consequently, the change in AVF in Figure 5.9 is sub-
linear, and thus, less sensitive to memory latency when compared with CPI.
AVF typically decreases with a decrease in memory latency, although it is
mathematically possible for it to increase as well, as seen with astar. The
comparison with simulation also serves to validate the model. The average
change in AVF as predicted by the model is 3.25 units, as compared to 2.22
1Although the circuit-level fault rate will significantly increase at low voltages, a constant
value provides insight into the change due to AVF
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units from simulation. The model faithfully captures the trend for change in
SER, with low error. Figure 5.9(b) illustrates the fraction of SER attributable
to each event, for a memory latency of 150, and 300 cycles. Although the
overall AVF remains nearly the same, the contribution of AVF in the shadow
of an L2 miss reduces significantly, for workloads that are dominated by L2
cache misses. Conversely, the relative contribution from ideal execution and
DTLB miss increases. The workload experiences fewer cycles from ACE bits in
the shadow of an L2 miss, but also fewer execution cycles overall, resulting in a
reduction in contribution from the L2 miss, and a greater relative contribution
from other misses towards overall SER.
5.8.2 Design Space Exploration
The model can be used to compare different microarchitectures for their
impact on performance and AVF/SER. Figure 5.10 presents the CPI and SER
of the wide-issue and narrow-issue machine outlined in Table 5.2. The SER
is computed for the ROB, LQ, SQ, IQ and FU, and is broken down into its
contributing events, so as to provide better insight. On average, there is an
81% increase in SER, and an average speedup of 1.35 (harmonic mean) going
from the narrow-issue to the wide-issue configuration. This is attributable to
an increase in ROB size and dispatch width. Unlike scaling the ROB size
(Section 5.8.1), increasing the issue-width typically increases the SER across
all workloads. From Equation 5.2, a larger instruction window is required to
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(b) Impact of scaling memory latency from 150 cycles (left) to 300
cycles (right)
Figure 5.9: Sensitivity of AVF to Memory Latency.
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loads considered in the experiments presented herein, β is between 1.24 and
2.39, resulting in a super-linear increase in the ideal occupancy. Although
branch resolution time increases with dispatch width, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that SER would generally increase with dispatch width, on a balanced
design. As noted in Section 5.8.1, namd and bwaves have long critical paths
K(W ). The workloads have sufficient ILP for the narrow-issue machine, but
not the wide-issue machine, resulting in maximum occupancy of state during
ideal execution for the wide-issue case. Additionally, bwaves also experiences
an increase in SER due to data L2 misses. The SER for bwaves and namd
increases by a factor of 2.26, and 2.6 respectively. On the other hand, mcf is
unaffected by increase in issue-width or ROB size, due to the large number of
dependent mispredicted branches in the shadow of its data L2 misses.
To understand the implications on multi-core design, the SER for a ho-
mogeneous Chip Multiprocessor (CMP) using multiple wide-issue and narrow
issue under the same area budget are compared. Using the McPAT simu-
lator [59], it is estimated that on a 32nm process, the wide-issue machine
(core+cache) has a 65% higher area than the narrow-issue machine. Given
that the wide-issue machine has on average 81% higher SER for the ROB,
LQ, SQ, IQ, a wide-issue multi-core CMP would be, on average, more vulner-
able for these structures, for the same area. Of course, not all structures have
been modeled herein (although the larger ones are covered), or the impact of
shared resources in the memory hierarchy considered, such as memory band-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































of state in most other structures in the core, this result gives some insight on
the SER of core structures in the CMPs, for the configurations under consider-
ation. It must also be emphasized that the result presented is only applicable
to the microarchitectures under consideration. A different microarchitectural
configuration for the wide-issue, narrow-issue, or both configurations may yield
different conclusions.
The model can also be used to provide insight into the efficacy of
soft error mitigation schemes. Gomaa et al. [13] propose an opportunistic
mechanism, called Partial Explicit Redundancy (PER), of enabling Redundant
Multi-Threading (RMT) [21] during low IPC events, such as L2/TLB miss,
and disabling it during high-IPC intervals, to minimize the performance loss.
RMT employs a lagging thread that re-executes the operations of the leading
thread and detects faults by comparing the output. Load values and branch
outcomes are forwarded by the leading thread so that the lagging thread does
not incur any miss penalties, and always runs in the ideal mode. Gomaa et
al. [13] report that PER reduces the AVF of the Issue Queue in their mi-
croarchitecture by an average of 57%. Using detailed simulation for a specific
microarchitecture, Sridharan et al. [60] investigate this effect for the ROB,
LQ, SQ, and IQ, and report that nearly 60% of vulnerability occurs in the
shadow of a long-stall instruction, most of which are data L2 cache misses.
Both studies were performed using workloads from SPEC CPU2000.
Under an optimistic assumption of no performance loss using the op-
portunistic scheme, the components of SER in Figure 5.10(b) corresponding
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to data L2 and TLB misses would disappear. Whereas this scheme generally
reduces the AVF of most workloads significantly (resulting in an SER reduc-
tion of 66% for the wide-issue machine), namd would still have high AVF.
Furthermore, namd has a high IPC of 3.8 during ideal execution such that
enabling RMT would result in roughly doubling the contribution of the ideal
interval towards overall CPI (Figure 5.10(a)). Of course, these results are mi-
croarchitecture and workload specific. For example, there is an average SER
reduction of 60% as computed using the model, when the memory latency of
the wide-issue machine is reduced to 150 cycles, as illustrated in Figure 5.9(b).
The results obtained using the model are similar to earlier work, and allows
architects to estimate the efficacy of such a scheme in the first order, for their
microarchitecture and workloads.
5.9 Workload Characterization for AVF
It is difficult to draw inferences on the effect of a workload on the AVF
of a structure using aggregate metrics, beyond a qualitative analysis. Aggre-
gate metrics such as cache miss rates or branch misprediction rates provide
hints, but as observed in earlier sections, there may be exceptions to such
general intuitions of occupancy of state. Given a microarchitecture such as
the wide-issue machine, the model enables an architect to identify namd as a
high-IPC workload inducing high AVF in multiple structures, and gobmk as a
comparably high-IPC workload that induces very low AVF in the same set of
structures. The model provides an explanation as to why workloads such as
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mcf with more non-overlapped data cache misses than bwaves induces much
lower AVF. The model uncovers the complex relationship between various mi-
croarchitectural events that combine to induce AVF in a structure. The model
provides the break-down of the contribution of each microarchitectural event
towards AVF, thereby enabling an intuitive understanding of their influence.
Fu et al. [14] report a “fuzzy relationship” between AVF and simple
performance metrics. Therefore, black-box statistical models for AVF that
utilize multiple microarchitectural metrics have been proposed by Walcott et
al. [9] and Duan et al. [10] for dynamic prediction of AVF. These models use
metrics such as average occupancy, and cumulative latencies of instructions in
various structures as inputs to the statistical model, which are not available
without detailed simualation. Cho et al. [11] utilize a neural-network based
methodology for design space exploration, and use it to model AVF of the IQ.
As each workload is associated with its own neural network model, training
it would potentially require a significant amount of detailed simulations. All
these models combine the software and hardware component of AVF, and do
not uncover the fundamental mechanisms influencing AVF, thereby providing
less insight than the approach presented herein. As the model is constructed
from the factors affecting AVF from first principles and explicity models this
fuzzy relationship, an architect can identify the precise cause of high or low
AVF in a particular structure, and characterize workloads for AVF.
The model enables the architect to study a greater number of workloads
and over longer intervals of execution than may be feasible using detailed
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simulation, and within the bounds of error of the model, to identify workloads
or regions of execution in the workload that induce high AVF in particular
structures, enabling better workload characterization for AVF.
5.10 Conclusion
In this work, a first-order mechanistic model for AVF is developed.
The model is derived from first-principles of out-of-order execution to provide
quantifiable insight into the factors affecting the AVF of structures, and re-
quires only inexpensive profiling. It is shown that this methodology has low
mean absolute error of less than 7%, for the ROB, LQ, SQ, IQ and FU.
Additionally, the model quantifies the impact of each microarchitec-
tural event on AVF and SER. The model can be used to nearly instanta-
neously perform studies on the impact of scaling the ROB size on its AVF and
performance, sensitivity of AVF to changes in memory latency, design space
exploration comparing the SER of different microarchitectures, and workload
characterization. This work enables the architect to identify workloads that





This chapter summarizes the conclusions of the work presented in this
dissertation, and outlines future research directions to aid better understand-
ing of the impact of workload execution on the visibility of soft errors, and
steps that need to be taken to mitigate them.
6.1 Summary and Conclusions
The problem of soft errors due to sub-atomic particle strikes is becom-
ing significant in current and future process generations, due to an exponential
increase in the number of transistors per chip, and the steady lowering of op-
erating and threshold voltages with each generation. Mitigation of soft errors
comes with a significant penalty of power, performance, area and design effort,
necessitating their judicious application. A good understanding of the impact
of workloads on the visibility of soft errors at the program output is critical for
efficient design of soft error mitigation schemes. Poor workload characteriza-
tion may lead to overdesigned, or underdesigned microarchitectures. However,
workload characterization for AVF, and selection of a sufficiently heteroge-
neous workload suite for AVF are an open problem.
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Two methodologies to enable the efficient design of soft error mitiga-
tion schemes are presented herein. In Chapter 4, an automated methodology
for bounding the worst-case soft error rate for a microprocessor running a re-
alizable workload was presented. The knowledge of this worst-case allows the
architect to determine whether the workload suite in use has sufficient cov-
erage for SER, and whether an additional guard band is necessary to make
up for any lack of coverage, while avoiding potential overdesign or underde-
sign. Näıve estimations of this worst-case will lead to pessimistic designs. It is
demonstrated that this workload achieves 1.4× higher SER in the core, 2.5×
higher SER in the data L1 cache and TLB, and 1.5× higher SER in L2 cache
as compared to the highest SER induced by SPEC CPU2006 and MiBench
programs for a processor similar to the Alpha 21264. The methodology is also
demonstrated to be flexible across different microarchitectures. A description
of the stressmark methodology presented herein has been published at the
forty-third International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO-43) [61].
Chapter 5 presents a first-order mechanistic model to estimate the AVF
of any structure in the core whose AVF correlates with its utilization. Derived
from the first principles of out-of-order CPU execution, this model is designed
to provide insight into the complex interaction between the workload and the
microarchitecture that together influence AVF. It is shown that this method-
ology has a mean absolute error in AVF estimation of less than 7%. The
mechanistic model is used to cheaply perform design space exploration and
parametric variation studies. The model may be used in conjunction with
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cycle accurate simulation by eliminating infeasible design points. More signif-
icantly, the construction of this model allows the architect to derive insight
into the precise mechanism affecting the AVF of a structure. Owing to its
construction, the model can be used for workload characterization for AVF,
which is not possible using black-box statistical or machine learning models, or
using aggregate metrics reported using cycle-accurate simulation. At the time
of writing, this work has been selected to be published at the thirty-nineth
International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA-39) [62].
6.2 Future Research Directions
The methodologies presented herein can be extended, or adapted to fur-
ther improve AVF modeling methodologies. Some of these potential research
directions are presented below.
6.2.1 AVF Stressmark for Multicore Machines
The AVF stressmark can be extended for multicore machines, in order
to estimate the overall SER of such a chip. In particular, multicore machines
have shared resources, such as on-chip interconnect, shared last-level caches,
memory controllers, etc. which additionally need to be modeled. The multi-
core AVF stressmark provides the architect with the worst-case SER possible
while running a multithreaded or multiprogrammed workload, and enables
design for the same. Ganesan et al. [44] use machine learning to develop
a methodology for multi-core power virus generation. They model the data
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sharing patterns between various workloads to exercise the interconnect and
the memory hierarchy such that power is maximized. A similar methodology
can be developed, that leverages this data sharing pattern between cores to
maximize SER. Ganesan et al. [44] find that exercising the interconnect and
memory hierarchy often results in a reduction in power consumption for the
core. Similarly, if the interconnect and memory controllers hold more state
than structures in the core, the GA will target these shared structures while
sacrificing some AVF/SER in the core itself to maximize overall SER.
6.2.2 Online Estimation of SER
The mechanistic model presented herein may be implemented in hard-
ware to estimate AVF of individual structures, or overall SER. This data may
be presented to the OS or software through performance counters, and the OS
or software may take remedial action, reducing the amount of hardware inter-
vention. Currently, AVF information is not available to software, and hence
software cannot take remedial action. Dynamic prediction of AVF has been
proposed in prior work by Walcott et al. [9], Duan et al. [10], and Sridharan
and Kaeli [46] as a means of enabling Redundant Multithreading (RMT) only
when the SER vulnerability is high. Disabling RMT during periods of low
vulnerability avoids the performance penalty of RMT during those periods.
The methodologies proposed by Walcott et al. and Duan et al. are regression-
based models, and neither provides a hardware implementation for the same.
Sridharan and Kaeli [46] propose H-Box hardware to predict AVF when used in
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conjunction with Program Vulnerability Factor data obtained from offline pro-
filing, but it requires extensive amount of hardware per structure to estimate
AVF. It may be possible to reduce the amount of hardware necessary using the
mechanistic model. Eyerman et al. [63, 64] leverage the mechanistic model for
CPI to develop CPI stacks for single-threaded, and multi-threaded CPUs. It
may be possible to enhance this mechanism to capture the statistics necessary
for estimating AVF. A significant challenge with online AVF estimation is ACE
analysis; specifically, the detection of dynamically dead instructions without
significant investment in hardware. Butts and Sohi [25] report that 3-16%
instructions are dynamically dead. Even if instructions are dynamically dead,
they are not completely immune to producing soft errors; faults in the target
register/address specifiers, or a change in opcode may still result in an error.
Consequently, it may not be a significant overestimation to treat dynamically
dead instructions as ACE, and achieve a slightly conservative bound on SER.
6.2.3 Estimating per-thread AVF or Resource Sharing in SMT
Simultaneous Multithreaded Processors (SMT) employ multiple hard-
ware contexts to allow sharing of resources within the chip. It is generally
difficult to estimate the impact of this resource sharing on AVF. Eyerman and
Eeckhout [33] use interval analysis to generate per-thread CPI stacks in SMT
processors. On similar lines, it may be possible to estimate the impact of SMT
on AVF of the processor. As the mechanistic model proposed herein estimates
occupancy, it may also be used to estimate the utilization of shared resources
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in the SMT by each hardware context. Although Chen et al. [65] use the
interval analysis model for CPI to dynamically partition shared resources, it
cannot estimate the utilization of each structure. The knowledge of the utiliza-
tion of each structure while running a set of workloads enables the architect
to perform sizing studies for the structure.
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